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semantic memory - remembering object features activates brain regions overlapping with or adjacent to
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evidence favoring these theories, it is important to understand both the commonalities in the mapping
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people, and use. In three studies, we found evidence that while conceptual knowledge is grounded in
neural substrates, several factors contribute to variations in semantic memory retrieval. In Chapter 2, we
used the logic often used in neuroimaging studies of semantic memory by demonstrating overlapping
chromaticity effects (e.g., greater response to colored than grayscale stimuli) in the left lingual gyrus for
both color perception and color knowledge. Chapter 3 investigated whether the mapping between
perception and memory varied across contexts and participants. Whereas context (here, fidelity of color
information as manipulated through task demand) varied the extent to which the left fusiform gyrus was
active during a color similarity judgment, individual differences in cognitive style predicted activity in the
left lingual gyrus. We replicated these results in a second experiment that controlled for stimulus modality
and anticipatory strategies. In Chapter 4, we used a training paradigm to investigate the role of feature
diagnosticity (i.e., features that best distinguish between two otherwise similar categories) in semantic
representations. Whereas subjects had knowledge of feature importance in novel object categorization,
whether they used this information affected neural representations. Ventral temporal brain regions were
more active during a separate retrieval task for subjects who learned and used the diagnostic feature for
object categorization. Additionally, behavioral ratings of similarity predicted multivariate neural similarity.
Collectively, this work suggests that semantic representations, integral to a memory system often thought
of as free of contextual constraints, contain meaningful variations across contexts, people, and use.
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ABSTRACT

CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY: BEHAVIORAL AND NEURAL VARIATIONS IN
SEMANTIC MEMORY RETRIEVAL
Nina Shen Hsu
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill
Understanding the neural organization of semantic memory – our shared general
knowledge – has the potential to uncover the neural mechanisms by which we give
meaning to the endless array of objects that we encounter in the world. One prominent set
of theories posits a distributed organization of semantic memory – remembering object
features activates brain regions overlapping with or adjacent to regions involved in
perceiving and acting on those features (e.g., Allport, 1985). Despite accumulated
evidence favoring these theories, it is important to understand both the commonalities in
the mapping between perception and memory, as well as meaningful variability across
sources such as contexts, people, and use. In three studies, we found evidence that while
conceptual knowledge is grounded in neural substrates, several factors contribute to
variations in semantic memory retrieval. In Chapter 2, we used the logic often used in
neuroimaging studies of semantic memory by demonstrating overlapping chromaticity
effects (e.g., greater response to colored than grayscale stimuli) in the left lingual gyrus
for both color perception and color knowledge. Chapter 3 investigated whether the
mapping between perception and memory varied across contexts and participants.
Whereas context (here, fidelity of color information as manipulated through task demand)
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varied the extent to which the left fusiform gyrus was active during a color similarity
judgment, individual differences in cognitive style predicted activity in the left lingual
gyrus. We replicated these results in a second experiment that controlled for stimulus
modality and anticipatory strategies. In Chapter 4, we used a training paradigm to
investigate the role of feature diagnosticity (i.e., features that best distinguish between
two otherwise similar categories) in semantic representations. Whereas subjects had
knowledge of feature importance in novel object categorization, whether they used this
information affected neural representations. Ventral temporal brain regions were more
active during a separate retrieval task for subjects who learned and used the diagnostic
feature for object categorization. Additionally, behavioral ratings of similarity predicted
multivariate neural similarity. Collectively, this work suggests that semantic
representations, integral to a memory system often thought of as free of contextual
constraints, contain meaningful variations across contexts, people, and use.

	
  
	
  

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... IX
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... XI
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ....................................................................................... XII
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2: CHROMATICITY OF COLOR PERCEPTION AND OBJECT
COLOR KNOWLEDGE ................................................................................................ 16
Abstract............................................................................................................................ 16
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 17
Method ............................................................................................................................. 19
Results .............................................................................................................................. 23
Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 28
CHAPTER 3: COLOR, CONTEXT, AND COGNITIVE STYLE: VARIATIONS IN
COLOR KNOWLEDGE RETRIEVAL AS A FUNCTION OF TASK AND
SUBJECT VARIABLES ................................................................................................ 45
Abstract............................................................................................................................ 45
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 47
Experiment 1: Methods .................................................................................................. 51
Experiment 1: Results..................................................................................................... 58
Experiment 1: Discussion ............................................................................................... 61
Experiment 2: Methods .................................................................................................. 63
	
  
	
  

ix

Experiment 2: Results..................................................................................................... 65
Experiment 2: Discussion ............................................................................................... 67
General Discussion .......................................................................................................... 69
CHAPTER 4: FEATURE DIAGNOSTICITY AFFECTS SEMANTIC
REPRESENTATIONS OF NOVEL OBJECTS .......................................................... 84
Abstract............................................................................................................................ 84
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 86
Methods............................................................................................................................ 91
Results .............................................................................................................................. 99
Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 106
CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ............. 126
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 137
DELETE THIS NOTE WHEN DONE: This template uses an automatically generated
table of contents, by designating chapters and chapter titles as “heading 1” under the
“styles” menu and subheadings as “heading 2” under the “styles menu, your table of
contents can be accurately and quickly generated by clicking in the table of contents and

	
  
	
  

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1. Mean and standard deviation of stimuli characteristics used in chromaticity
task.…………………………………………………………………………..... 34
Table 2.2. List of stimuli used in the chromaticity task……………………....……

35

Table 2.3. Regions identified from the 27 maxima in the exploratory, whole-brain
analysis……………………………………………………………………..…..

38

Table 3.1. Clusters identified in the secondary exploratory, whole-brain analysis… 76
Table 4.1. Subject training schedule, in which the specific combination of tasks is
indicated for each session of the experiment…………………………………… 113
Table 4.2. The list of questions used in the shape retrieval task that subjects performed
while undergoing fMRI………………………………………………………..... 114

	
  
	
  

xi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 2.1. Examples of chromaticity stimuli from each task ……………………… 41
Figure 2.2. Co-localization of color perception and color knowledge …………….. 42
Figure 2.3. Exploratory analyses …………………………………………………... 43
Figure 2.4. Signal change trends in ventral but not dorsal regions………………..

44

Figure 3.1. Design of Experiment 1………………………………………………… 78
Figure 3.2. Design of Experiment 2………………………………………………… 79
Figure 3.3. Task accuracy and left lingual gyrus activity correlate with cognitive style
preference ……………………………………………………………………….. 80
Figure 3.4. Areas of visual cortex show differences in activity when retrieving color
knowledge at differing levels of detail …………………………………………. 81
Figure 3.5. Color perception and color knowledge retrieval activate overlapping brain
regions………………………………………………………………………….. 82
Figure 3.6. Color knowledge retrieval recruits overlapping brain regions in both
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2………………………………………………… 83
Figure 4.1. Exemplars from the color+shape object set…………………………….. 117
Figure 4.2. Exemplars from the shape object set……………………………………. 118
Figure 4.3. Naming accuracy by session…………………………………………… 119
Figure 4.4. Differences in knowing versus naming colors………………………… 120
Figure 4.5. Similarity judgments vary by group……………………………………. 121
Figure 4.6. Group differences in activation of a color perception region during a shape
retrieval task…………………………………………….……………………… 122
Figure 4.7. Task activity in the left inferior temporal gyrus ………………………. 123
Figure 4.8. Correlating behavioral and neural similarity…………………………… 124

	
  
	
  

xii

Figure 4.9. Correlating color prioritization with task activity………………………. 125

	
  
	
  

xiii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

What color are fire engines? What sounds do cows make? These are questions
that you can easily answer, but can you remember where or when you first acquired this
information? Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists often refer to semantic memory
as shared knowledge about the world that gives meaning to objects and concepts. In his
seminal article, “Episodic and semantic memory,” Endel Tulving borrowed the term
semantics from linguists in order to describe a memory system for “words and other
verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about
rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and
relations” (Tulving, 1972).
Semantic memory refers to shared general knowledge concerning objects, words,
facts, and beliefs. Psychologists distinguish it from episodic memory, which is another
major category of declarative memory, by referring to our ability to retrieve semantic
information independent of specific experiences. In other words, semantic knowledge can
be retrieved without reference to the original circumstances under which it was first
acquired. For example, remembering the color of a fire engine constitutes semantic
knowledge, whereas remembering where you were when you last heard a fire engine
would be episodic knowledge. In a taxonomy of long-term memory (e.g., Squire, 1987),
episodic memory and semantic memory are characterized as being distinct parts of the
explicit, or declarative, memory system. Under this framework, episodic memory is
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associated with events, whereas semantic memory is associated with facts. Tulving
suggests that "the semantic system may be quite independent of the episodic memory" —
but in order to have semantic knowledge, there must have been some episode where the
information was learned (i.e., a specific time and place). Cognitive psychologists and
cognitive neuroscientists have been investigating how we acquire semantic knowledge,
and what neural mechanisms underlie this acquisition and information storage, so that we
can make better sense of the endless number of things in the world around us.

A glimpse of semantic memory through neuropsychological studies
Neuropsychological studies of patients with amnesia due to medial temporal lobe
atrophy often exhibited impairments in both semantic and episodic memory (Gabrieli,
Cohen, & Corkin, 1988; Stefanacci, Buffalo, Schmolck, & Squire, 2000), but other
patient work indicates that impaired episodic memory can be accompanied by relatively
intact semantic memory (Gabrieli et al., 1988; Gardiner, Brandt, Baddeley, VarghaKhadem, & Mishkin, 2008; O’Kane, Kensinger, & Corkin, 2004; Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997). This work suggests that these two systems are at least partially independent. Other
studies have demonstrated that in some cases, semantic knowledge can be selectively
lost. Elizabeth Warrington first noted in 1975 that patients with semantic dementia — a
temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia — demonstrated a “failure to recognize or
identify common objects” that could not be accounted for by intellectual impairment,
sensory or perceptual deficits, or language disorders (Warrington, 1975). Semantic
dementia is associated with gradual and selective atrophy of the anterior temporal cortex,
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wherein patients with otherwise intact speech fluency exhibit marked deficits in
identifying objects, concepts and people (Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1999).
Importantly, these patients retain episodic knowledge of recent autobiographical events
(Graham, Lambon, & Hodges, 1997; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996).
Some patients exhibit even more selective deficits in semantic knowledge, in
which specific categories of knowledge are lost. Some patients with category-specific
deficits had difficulty naming living things (e.g., parrot, snail) but not nonliving things
(e.g., briefcase, compass), whereas others have presented with the opposite problem
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). In thinking about ways in
which semantic memory might be organized, one proposal is that semantic knowledge
divides along categorical, or domain-specific, boundaries (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998).
On the other hand, early functional neuroimaging studies showed anatomical distinctions
between objects according to features (sometimes called attributes or properties), even
within a single category (Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999). In one
early study, Martin and colleagues demonstrated that retrieving color information about
an object ("yellow" for pencil) activated ventral temporal cortex, whereas retrieving
motor information about the same object ("write" for pencil) activated middle temporal
and frontal cortex (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). Further,
distinct but overlapping regions were activated when presenting the objects as words or
as pictures, suggesting that different stimulus modalities tapped into common neural
substrates of color or action information. Subsequent work has demonstrated that in line
with these frameworks, there can be further sub-distinctions, such as grasp and function
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of use within motor properties (e.g., Boronat et al., 2005), or color, size, and form within
visual properties (e.g., Thompson-Schill, 2003).

Theories on the organization of semantic memory
There have been a number of theories developed to explain how our semantic
knowledge is represented in the brain. Early models assumed an amodal structure to a
conceptual representation — each concept was represented in a single node that was part
of a larger, unitary semantic network (Collins & Quillian, 1969), and connections to other
nodes allowed us to make meaningful associations between concepts. These and other
models (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984) posit an arbitrary relationship between
perception and knowledge representation — our semantic knowledge is organized
abstractly and is fundamentally amodal. Though not explicitly addressed, these models
assumed situational invariance — under all contexts and circumstances, the connections
between semantic representations (as well as the representations themselves) remained
stable and fixed. That is, no matter how a particular concept is activated or accessed, that
evoked concept would always be the same each time.
A different explanation for the evident neural dissociation of semantic knowledge
categories is that distinct brain regions may be responsible for different categories of
knowledge — for example, one region for living things and a different region for nonliving things. In this domain-specific model of semantic memory (see Caramazza &
Shelton, 1998), distinct brain regions are innately tuned to represent those categories
necessary for survival (e.g., animals, fruits, vegetables, tools). On this account, distinct
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and non-overlapping representations of these categories would be stored in corresponding
non-overlapping brain regions that have adapted to specialization for these categories.
Elaborations of this model (Mahon & Caramazza, 2003, 2011) posit that these
representations may be organized by property (i.e., sensorimotor-based), but that within
each modality, the specific categories remain distinct, perhaps constrained by anatomical
or functional connectivity. Domain-specific theories depart from the notion of a unitary
semantic network, but nevertheless maintain that conceptual representations — while
organized by domain or category — remain situationally invariant and fixed.
An alternative to domain-specific theories is sensory-functional theory, which
assumes that semantic memory is organized according to the sensory and functional
properties of objects. Different representations might rely on sensory and functional
information to varying extents (e.g., Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington &
McCarthy, 1987), and category-specific deficits could arise from an organization of
semantic knowledge that would not necessarily require explicit categorical boundaries.
Noting that this binary sensory-functional divide might be overly simplistic, Allport
(1985) proposed that sensory information could be further subdivided into multiple
attributes (e.g., color, form, sound), so that "the same neural elements that are involved in
coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to eye or hand or
ear also make up the elements of the auto-associated activity-patterns that represent
familiar object-concepts in ‘semantic memory.'" Thus, in sensorimotor- or property-based
theories of semantic memory (Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005;
Alex Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003), object knowledge is organized in a
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distributed, modality-specific fashion, and is stored in overlapping or adjacent brain
regions that are involved in perceiving and acting on those objects. Importantly, these
theories permit the notion of conceptual flexibility: features can be dynamically recruited
depending on the circumstances. That is, the degree to which a feature contributes to the
concept can vary, depending on both the importance of the feature (relative to other
features) and the context under which the concept is evoked.
A third set of theories considers the correlation of certain features that tend to
occur for the majority of members within a category (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, &
Seidenberg, 1998; Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler
& Moss, 2001). Here, features can consist not only of sensory information about an
object, but also of experience-based or encyclopedic knowledge concerning features of
the object. Classes of objects are determined by the differential extent to which particular
features co-occur with other members of the category (e.g., the general category of
“living things” might be predominantly composed of members that "have four legs" and
"have fur"). Importantly, because members within a category can share a large number of
features, these models propose that distinctive or diagnostic features are necessary in
order to identify individual members of the set. In addition to considering the differential
importance of features for a concept, these theories also posit experience-dependence.
Over the long term, contextual constraints that are relevant during learning contribute to
the overall concept.
In sum, these theories generally assume that distinct neural regions are
responsible for distributed semantic representations. But what neural substrates underlie
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our ability to perform higher-level abstraction, convergence, and manipulation of this
information? Semantic memory models that incorporate "convergence zones" (Damasio,
1989) posit that distinct brain regions are involved in integrating and processing general
semantic information, as opposed to modality-specific semantic information, while
maintaining category-like topography (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). There is no general
consensus on the specific regions that are responsible for this higher-level convergence.
Some researchers have suggested that the anterior temporal poles serve a critical role in
semantic integration (Lambon Ralph, Lowe, & Rogers, 2007; Patterson, Nestor, &
Rogers, 2007; Rogers et al., 2004), whereas others posit that integration occurs in an
interactive hierarchy throughout much of the ventral temporal cortex and in the inferior
parietal lobe (Binder & Desai, 2011).

Functional neuroimaging studies of semantic memory
As described above, much research on semantic memory has relied on studies of
patients with different types of problems in semantic knowledge. More recently, the
development of functional neuroimaging techniques, such as positron emission
technology (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has allowed
cognitive neuroscientists to explore various hypotheses regarding the neurobiology of
semantic memory in healthy individuals.
Some early neuroimaging studies sought to examine whether semantic knowledge
could be organized along categorical boundaries, with distinct neural substrates for
different object categories. Most of these studies examined differences between living
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and nonliving things, or between animals and tools. When naming living things, subjects
tended to activate medial temporal cortex, whereas naming nonliving things activated the
left medial occipital cortex (Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Wise, 1996). Spitzer and
colleagues (Spitzer et al., 1998; Spitzer, Kwong, Kennedy, Rosen, & Belliveau, 1995)
also found category-specific activation on frontal and temporo-parietal regions. Naming
of animals resulted in activation in the medial temporo-occipital cortex, including
fusiform gyrus (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; Grabowski,
Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Grossman et al., 2002; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, &
Haxby, 1996; Okada et al., 2000; Perani et al., 1995), whereas naming of tools activated
the posterior temporal cortex (Damasio et al., 1996; Grabowski et al., 1998; Grossman et
al., 2002; Martin et al., 1996; Okada et al., 2000; Perani et al., 1995), inferior parietal
regions (Okada et al., 2000), and premotor cortex (Damasio et al., 1996; Grabowski et al.,
1998). One study also found that lateral fusiform activity was specific to animal naming,
whereas medial fusiform activity was specific to tool naming (Chao, Haxby, & Martin,
1999), though a subsequent study did not find category-specific activation in the fusiform
gyrus (Tyler et al., 2003).
Taken together, these results would suggest that semantic memory is organized
categorically, in that distinct anatomical regions are differentially activated when
retrieving information about different object categories. However, as briefly outlined
earlier, sensory-functional and sensorimotor theories can also account for putatively
category-specific activation. These theories posit differential weighting of attributes (e.g.,
visual or functional) that might vary by category, giving rise to semantic structure that is
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not explicitly organized by category. Neuroimaging studies also provide corroboration
for such theories — in an early example, naming of both animals and tools activated the
ventral temporal cortex. Importantly, naming animals selectively activated left medial
occipital areas, whereas naming tools selectively activated left premotor areas (Martin et
al., 1996).
The idea that different features carry differing amounts of importance for a given
object raises several additional areas for study, both on the contextual issues surrounding
the representations, and more generally on how object representations allow us to make
sense of constant variation in the world. Context (i.e., a source of variation) can be
important at different timescales in semantic memory. It may play an important role
initially, in that when we acquire features about an object, contextual variation may
interact with construction of the semantic representation as a whole, over the long term.
Context may also be relevant for short-term demands, in the sense that circumstances
such as the immediate task or the specific type of stimulus might influence differential
access to the semantic representation. As one example, Martin and colleagues (1995)
found that distinct neural regions were involved in remembering color or action
information about objects. They found overlapping but distinct regions when presenting
the objects as words or pictures. The overlap was interpreted as consistency across
stimulus modality, but what about the areas activated for words but not pictures (and vice
versa)? How might contextual factors such as stimulus modality tap into conceptual
representations?
The influence of context through an interaction of task and category has been
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illustrated in at least one neuroimaging study (Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). For
category, if semantic knowledge is distributed by feature, then retrieving different object
features (e.g., visual or functional) about different object categories (e.g., living or nonliving things) should activate distinct brain regions. For task, specifically, retrieving nonvisual information about living things (e.g., whether zebras live in Africa) would activate
regions involved in visual knowledge, because visual information is strongly tied to the
object representation. Accessing a weaker part of the object representation (i.e., nonvisual knowledge) would nevertheless be sufficient to activate the stronger part of the
representation (here, visual knowledge). Furthermore, retrieving semantic knowledge
about the visual features of non-living things should activate regions involved in visual
knowledge, even if functional information may be more important overall.
Thompson-Schill and colleagues (1999) found evidence for exactly this type of
dissociation. They observed activity in the left fusiform gyrus, a region associated with
visual knowledge, during retrieval of both visual and non-visual information about living
things. They also observed activity in this same region during retrieval of non-living
things, but only when asking about visual features of such objects. Phillips and colleagues
had complementary findings, in which action and non-action tasks activated the left
middle temporal cortex for tools, whereas only action tasks activated the same region for
fruits (Phillips, Humphreys, Noppeney, & Price, 2002). Together, these findings (and
others) suggest that putatively category-specific activations may instead reflect the
different levels of importance associated with features in different object categories. They
also suggest that short-term contextual factors such as task demand can affect semantic
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memory retrieval.
The evidence thus far suggests that neuroimaging studies tend to support featurebased theories of semantic memory. These theories make an additional prediction: the
same neural regions involved in perceiving and acting on objects should also be activated
when retrieving knowledge about those objects. Neuroimaging studies have also provided
some evidence in support of this prediction, by demonstrating overlapping or adjacent
neural substrates for visual knowledge (Chao & Martin, 1999; Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim,
& Alpert, 1995; Martin et al., 1995; Simmons et al., 2007), hearing (Hughes et al., 2001;
Kraemer, Macrae, Green, & Kelley, 2005; Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000; Yoo,
Lee, & Choi, 2001), and action (Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller,
2004; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003; Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski, & ThompsonSchill, 2009; Yee, Drucker, & Thompson-Schill, 2010).
Feature-based models predict that there may be considerable overlap of brain
regions involved in both perception and memory of object features. Consequently, we can
propose adding another theoretical principle of information processing. Functional and
anatomical dissection of the brain into multiple visual areas (e.g., V1, V2, etc.), based on
the observation that visual areas respond preferentially to different types of stimuli, has
primarily been associated with explanatory theories focusing on hierarchy and parallel
processing (see Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004 for review). Hierarchical visual processing
suggests that we first locally process visual information in high resolution, with a high
degree of similarity to how that information was initially perceived. After this initial local
processing, the visual information is then abstracted and processed more holistically as it
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moves through visual processing streams. Further, we can conceptually divide this visual
information into two main components: a ventral “what” stream important for object
recognition and form, and a dorsal “where” stream responsible for processing spatial and
motor information about the stimulus. We can consider these distinctions to be roughly
analogous to the divisions described in sensorimotor models of semantic memory.
Moreover, we can consider these “streams” to be pathways along which neural
representations might vary along multiple dimensions, wherein multiple visual areas
underlie multiple semantic representations.

Motivation for the current studies
For the experiments described in Chapters 2-4, we investigated semantic memory
through the domain of object color. Research focusing on object color is convenient for
several reasons. First, as a feature that is often critical for object identification, color
allows research into behavioral and neural measures of semantic memory retrieval, as
well as possible correlations between these attributes. Second, color is a feature that is
solely experienced through the visual modality, unlike features such as shape or size.
Third, several previous studies in neuroimaging have already examined color perception
in the context of semantic memory, which helps to provide a foundation of prior research
for the current set of studies, as well as some a priori predictions which can be tested.
The existing literature on semantic memory (both psychological and neural) has
generally sought to investigate semantic representations that are, as Allport wrote,
“patterns of events that are already familiar (i.e. that stably recur)” (1985). In other
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words, semantic memory has often been treated as if it were essentially void of context.
Episodic memory carries an autobiographical tag — contextual information comprised of
some degree of spatial and/or temporal association. But, even though semantic memory
may be defined as having some detachment from autobiographical content, there are
reported variabilities, despite the “general” consensus shown by neuroimaging. As one
example, color studies in semantic memory often cite ventral temporal regions as being
involved in both color perception and memory retrieval. Chao & Martin (1999) failed to
find overlap in brain regions involved in both processes, but Simmons and colleagues
(2007) did find overlap in the left fusiform gyrus. Our understanding of the neurobiology
of semantic memory would be enhanced if we can better understand this variability, as it
would help to clarify the extent to which semantic memory may be less stable and fixed
than was previously believed. That is, given this observed variability, are neural
representations stable and fixed, or are they linked to contextual constraints that may
occur at differing timescales?
The goal of this dissertation was to examine contextual factors that contribute to
variability in semantic memory retrieval. The research has two main goals: first, to
investigate systematic factors in memory retrieval; and second, to provide a framework
which would incorporate the varying results which have emerged from prior research.
We begin, in Chapter 2, by first using the logic behind most neuroimaging studies of
semantic memory. Through chromaticity (i.e., a greater response to colored than to
grayscale stimuli), we investigated whether overlapping brain regions are involved in
perception and memory. This chromaticity effect has often been used in color perception
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and psychophysics experiments (Beauchamp, Haxby, Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999;
Simmons et al., 2007). Here, in accordance with sensorimotor theory, we sought to
examine whether memory retrieval would parallel the chromaticity effect in color
perception. If we could demonstrate activation in a given brain region during both color
perception and knowledge retrieval, then this would provide evidence that similar neural
substrates are involved in both processes.
Having established the theoretical paradigm in Chapter 2, we turn to factors that
contribute to variability in semantic memory under a number of different circumstances.
First, in Chapter 3, we examine context and cognitive style, these being two factors that
can modulate differences in brain activity observed during color knowledge retrieval. In
order to examine the role of context, which is a task factor, we manipulated the level of
detail that subjects retrieved about object color. In order to examine the role of cognitive
style, which is a subject factor, we asked subjects to self-report their preference for words
or pictures. By using this approach, we can investigate whether semantic memory — as
expressed in terms of knowledge of object color — would likely be the same under all
conditions (i.e., short-term context within the demands of the current trial), and for all
people (i.e, generalizing to the population as a whole).
In Chapter 4, we consider the notion of how different features might take on
varying levels of importance in a given object representation, and apply this concept to a
novel object training paradigm. More specifically, Chapter 4 uses this training paradigm
to examine the role of feature diagnosticity — those features that permit distinctions
between otherwise similar items. This methodology allows us to systematically
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manipulate object stimulus properties, tasks, and object environments. As noted
previously, in Chapter 3 we treated context as a short-term task factor. By contrast, in
Chapter 4 we vary context as a long-term, learned factor, and consequently are able to
test whether semantic memory retrieval will be the same under all conditions (i.e., longterm context). The training paradigm laid out in Chapter 4 allows us to explicitly
manipulate long-term context in terms of visual experience and semantic memory, and
thus to study subsequent psychological and neural measures of feature diagnosticity in
newly learned object representations.
Semantic memory allows us to give meaning to, and make sense of, the constant
variation that we experience in the world on a daily basis. In order to better understand
semantic memory, we must investigate sources of these semantic memory variations —
in different contexts, for different people, and in different utilities. Taken together, the
work presented in Chapters 2-4 helps to shed light on some of the sources of variability in
semantic memory retrieval for both common and novel objects.
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CHAPTER 2: Chromaticity of color perception and object color knowledge
Hsu, N.S., Frankland, S.M., & Thompson-Schill, S.L. (2012). Chromaticity of color
perception and object color knowledge. Neuropsychologia, 50(2), 327-333.
Abstract
Sensorimotor theories of semantic memory require overlap between conceptual and
perceptual representations. One source of evidence for such overlap comes from
neuroimaging reports of co-activation during memory retrieval and perception. For
example, regions involved in color perception (i.e., regions that respond more to colored
than grayscale stimuli) are activated by retrieval of object color. One unanswered
question from these studies is whether the distinctions that are observed during
perception are also observed during memory retrieval. That is, are regions defined by a
chromaticity effect in perception similarly modulated by the chromaticity of remembered
objects (e.g., lemons more than coal)? Subjects performed color perception and color
retrieval tasks while undergoing fMRI. We observed increased activation during both
perception and memory retrieval of chromatic compared to achromatic stimuli in
overlapping areas of the left lingual gyrus, but not in dorsal or anterior regions activated
during color perception. These results provide evidence in support of sensorimotor
theories, but suggest important distinctions within the conceptual system.
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Introduction
According to sensorimotor theories of semantic memory, object knowledge is
organized in a modality-specific fashion, and distributed in or near the brain regions
responsible for perceiving and acting on objects (Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999;
Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). Numerous behavioral, neuroimaging, and
neuropsychological studies have provided evidence supporting these theories, and
neuroimaging studies in particular have demonstrated that retrieval of knowledge about
object features will recruit the brain regions which would be involved in perceiving those
features (Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003). For this study, we investigated color in
the visual modality. Color has several features, which are useful for our purposes. It is
especially important for object recognition, and also is perceived solely through the
visual modality, unlike other features of object appearance such as shape or size.
Consequently, sensorimotor theories offer clear predictions about how color information
is represented in semantic memory.
Cortical regions involved in color perception are typically defined as those
responding more to viewing of colored stimuli than grayscale stimuli. Previously,
subjects have passively viewed colored and grayscale Mondrians (Chao & Martin, 1999;
Howard et al., 1998), actively viewed these stimuli by detecting characters in the displays
(Beauchamp et al., 1999), or actively made luminance judgments on the FarnsworthMunsell 100 Hue stimuli (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). There is some
variability with respect to the brain regions activated during these tasks, but they all tend
to include lateralized or bilateral fusiform and lingual gyri. Some studies have also
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investigated brain regions involved in color knowledge retrieval, using different tasks
including judgments of color similarity (Howard et al., 1998), object color naming (Chao
& Martin, 1999; Martin et al., 1995), as well as property verification (Simmons et al.,
2007). In particular, two studies found activation of the left fusiform gyrus during both a
color perception task and color knowledge retrieval task, suggesting that areas involved
in perceiving color are also involved when retrieving object color (Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver,
Schlichting, & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Simmons et al., 2007).
This prior research has not resolved two interesting questions. First, tasks
involving color perception tend to result in activation of several brain areas, but
neuroimaging studies found overlap only in one anterior region. Why were posterior
regions not activated during color knowledge retrieval? Second, previous studies did not
use a color knowledge retrieval task that is directly analogous to the color perception
tasks. That is, if brain regions involved in color perception are identified as those
responding more to colored than grayscale stimuli, then we would expect a similar
chromaticity effect in color knowledge (i.e., thinking about the colors of lemons versus
coal). Specifically, we would expect differential recruitment of color perception regions,
when retrieving knowledge about chromatic versus achromatic object colors.
To address these issues, we conducted the current investigation, in which subjects
retrieved color knowledge by comparing luminance of named object pairs while
undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For the conditions of interest,
these object pairs were of two chromatic objects, or two achromatic objects. Subjects also
performed a color perception task, in which they judged the luminance of colored or
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grayscale visual displays. We found overlapping brain regions involved in both
perception and knowledge retrieval in a posterior region, this being the left lingual gyrus.
Further, we found that in ventral but not dorsal regions involved in the color perception
task, there was more activity when retrieving chromatic versus achromatic color
knowledge. Our findings are the first to demonstrate that chromaticity distinctions in
color perception extend to color knowledge, and thus provide further support to
sensorimotor theories of semantic memory.

Method
Participants
Eighteen right-handed, native English speakers with no history of neurological
disorders participated in this study (8 males; average age: 23.3). All subjects provided
informed consent and practiced both tasks prior to scanning. The University of
Pennsylvania IRB approved all experimental procedures. Participants received monetary
compensation for their participation.

Task — color knowledge retrieval
Subjects made a luminance judgment on a named pair of objects, indicating which
object was lighter or darker. The conditions of interest named chromatic (e.g., LEMON
and BASKETBALL) or achromatic (e.g. COAL and SNOW) objects. The 206 objects
(102 achromatic, 104 chromatic) used in the experiment were rated for color agreement
(> 66%) by an independent group of 24 subjects, drawn from the same population as the
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study sample. The conditions did not differ from one another in terms of frequency, word
length, concreteness, familiarity, imageability, or percent color/chromatic agreement (see
Table 2.1 for characteristics of word stimuli). There were 98 trials for each condition. As
a baseline task, subjects judged which of a pair of abstract (e.g., GREED and DELIGHT)
concepts was better or worse. For a list of stimuli used in the color knowledge task, see
Table 2.2.
At the beginning of each trial, a pair of words and a prompt, randomly assigned to
display “lighter?” or “darker?” (“better?” or “worse?” for the abstract condition)
simultaneously appeared on the screen for 2700 msec (see Figure 2.1). During this time
window, the subjects’ task was to decide which named object was lighter or darker,
indicating their response via button press. At the end of the trial, a central fixation cross
appeared for 300 msec, for a total trial duration of 3000 msec.
We blocked conditions as follows: 7 trials of one condition (21 seconds) followed
by 12 seconds of passive fixation, 7 trials of the second condition followed by 12 seconds
of passive fixation, then 7 trials of the third condition, and so on. We permuted condition
order across subjects, but there was always a fixed stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) for
the 7 trials in each 21 second block. We used E-Prime software (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.) to present stimuli and to collect response data.

Task — color perception
After subjects completed the color retrieval task, we administered a functional
localizer to identify brain regions involved in color perception. Participants saw blocks of
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the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 hue stimuli, in which they judged whether the wedges
making up colored or grayscale wheels were sequentially ordered from lightest to
darkest. The methods and stimuli for this task have been used previously to identify brain
regions involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2011; W.
Simmons et al., 2007).

Scanning Procedure
We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with a standard 8channel head coil and foam padding to secure the head position. After we acquired T1weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size =
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.0 mm), each subject performed four runs of the color
knowledge retrieval task, followed by two runs of the color perception task, while
undergoing blood oxygen dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected
774 sets of 42 slices using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000
msec, TE = 30 msec, FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0
mm). Nine seconds of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each
functional scan to allow for steady-state magnetization; during this initial time period, we
did not present stimuli or collect fMRI data.

Image Processing
We analyzed the data using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject was processed using the
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FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence; motion corrected
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first
functional image as a reference; and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Data were smoothed using a 9mm fullwidth half-max Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing for each subject, a
power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency function, and this
model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the functional data
(Zarahn, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 1997).
We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each
subject’s data to the four runs of the color retrieval task, in which the conditions of
interest (chromatic, achromatic, abstract) were each modeled as a 21-second block and
convolved with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several covariates of no
interest (global signal, scan effects, movement, spikes) were also included in the model.
An adjusted response latency for each trial for all conditions (i.e., a mean centered log
transformation of each subject’s RT) was also entered as a continuous covariate of no
interest, to address any difficulty or “time on task” confounds. From this model, we
computed parameter estimates for each condition (compared to fixation baseline) at each
voxel, and these estimates were included in the group-level random effects analyses
described below. Independently, we fit a second modified GLM to each subject’s data
from the two runs of the color perception task, in which the conditions of interest
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(colored versus grayscale stimuli) were modeled as blocks in the same manner as
described above. Aside from this difference in the conditions of interest, the two models
were constructed identically.

Results
Behavioral Results
Color knowledge retrieval task: There was a significant RT difference across
conditions, F(2, 51) = 5.78, p = 0.005 (chromatic: M = 1873 ms, SD = 173 ms;
achromatic: M = 1782 ms, SD = 145 ms; abstract: M = 1694 ms, SD = 155 ms). We found
this RT difference substantial enough to warrant entering the RT for each trial as a
continuous covariate of no interest in the GLM, such that any differences reported below
describe condition differences, rather than RT differences. Note that the inclusion of this
covariate has the effect of underestimating the chromaticity effect on the BOLD
response.
Color perception task: There were no RT differences between chromatic and
achromatic perceptual judgments [(chromatic: M = 1473 ms, SD = 204 ms; achromatic:
M = 1439 ms, SD = 230 ms), t(17) = 1.43, p = 0.17)], though participants were
significantly worse at chromatic judgments [(chromatic: M = 73%, SD = 5.6%;
achromatic: M = 79%, SD = 5.9%), t(17) = 3.00, p = 0.008].

Functional Region of Interest Analyses: Left Lingual Gyrus
To establish functionally defined regions of interest (fROIs) in which to assess the
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effects of chromaticity on color knowledge retrieval, we first performed a group-level
random effects analysis on the color perception data, comparing brain activity of colored
stimuli to that of grayscale stimuli as in prior studies. No regions responded more to
grayscale than colored stimuli. We corrected for multiple comparisons (at α = 0.05) by
performing 1000 Monte Carlo permutations of the data, deriving a critical threshold of t =
6.16 (Nichols & Holmes, 2002). When examining those regions that responded more to
colored than grayscale stimuli, only one fROI (17 voxels) in the left lingual gyrus
(Talairach coordinates: -9, -87, 4) surpassed the corrected threshold. Within this region,
we calculated parameter estimates for each subject, for each condition of the color
retrieval task, on the spatially-averaged time series. We assessed an effect of concrete
versus abstract concepts by testing a comparison of both types of conceptual knowledge
to abstract knowledge. The chromaticity effect was assessed by using a paired t-test of
the difference between the chromatic and achromatic parameters. In the left lingual gyrus,
there was significantly greater activity when retrieving concrete versus abstract
knowledge ([Chromatic + Achromatic] — Abstract; t(17) = 2.85, p = 0.01). Critically,
there was significantly greater activity when retrieving chromatic versus achromatic
knowledge ([Chromatic – Achromatic]; t(17) = 2.29, p = 0.04]).
The preceding analyses establish that a chromaticity effect during color retrieval
is observed in a region that exhibits a chromaticity effect during color perception. This
effect, while a direct test of the hypothesis of interest, is a narrow way to address the
extent and location of overlap during perception and memory processing. Towards this
end, we visually assessed co-localization of regions involved in both tasks. In a manner
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similar to the group-level random effects analysis performed on the color perception data,
we performed a similar analysis on the color knowledge retrieval data, again from all 18
subjects. For this dataset, we compared brain activity in the chromatic condition to that in
the achromatic condition. Next, within occipital brain regions, we identified the top 50
voxels that were most active during each task, irrespective of threshold. For the color
perception task, Talairach coordinates for the peak voxel were -9, -87, 4. For the color
knowledge task, Talairach coordinates for the peak voxel were -9, -93, 2. As seen in
Figure 2.2, we found co-localization of seven voxels in the left lingual gyrus. This result
suggests not only that the lingual gyrus is involved in both color perception and
knowledge retrieval, but that it is recruited more for the chromatic condition in both
processes (more so than the achromatic condition of both processes).

Exploratory Whole Brain Analyses: Ventral and Dorsal Distinctions
In order to ascertain the specificity of this effect, we examined brain activity at a
less stringent threshold to determine whether other brain regions were active for either
task. For this exploratory analysis, we examined the group color perception data at an
uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001(t = 3.97), which yielded 27 distinct clusters, as shown
in Figure 2.3. We then created 27 fROIs of comparable size by identifying each
individual local maximum and any of the 26 surrounding voxels that also surpassed the
uncorrected threshold (see Table 2.3 for the coordinates of these local maxima). In order
to assess the chromaticity effect during memory retrieval within these regions, we
calculated parameter estimates for each subject for each condition (compared to baseline)
	
  
	
  

25

on the spatially-averaged time series across voxels within each fROI.
Upon doing this, we observed an unanticipated pattern, which is evident in the
order we have arranged the clusters in Figure 2.4: The difference in response to
chromatic versus achromatic memory retrieval was larger and more consistent in the
ventral fROIs than in the dorsal fROIs. Although the chromaticity effects did not reach
significance in individual fROIs, the reliability of the pattern can be established with a
post-hoc binomial test. In the nine most ventral fROIs (z < 5), all nine of the fROIs
showed numerically greater activation for chromatic compared to achromatic stimuli (p =
0.004). In contrast, the pattern was not consistent across the 18 dorsal fROIs (p = 0.48).
Although these results should be interpreted with caution, they suggest that the effect
reported above in the left lingual gyrus may be a more widespread pattern in ventral but
not dorsal regions of the visual system. In the following section, motivated by previous
work, we take a closer look at one such region, the left fusiform gyrus.

Secondary Region of Interest Analyses: Fusiform Gyrus
Previous research has shown that the fusiform gyrus is involved in both color
knowledge retrieval and color imagery and perception (Howard et al., 1998; Simmons et
al., 2007). In all analyses thus far, ROIs were functionally defined, and the fusiform
gyrus did not emerge as an active region when contrasting the chromatic to achromatic
conditions in either task (i.e., activity did not surpass either the uncorrected or permuted
threshold). However, for our color knowledge task, the left fusiform gyrus was robustly
active when comparing both chromatic and achromatic pairs (combined) to the abstract
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pairs (t[17] = 4.63, p < .001). The Talairach coordinates for the peak active voxel for this
contrast were -33, -36, -13 ; this is almost identical to the peak voxel in left fusiform
gyrus as reported by Simmons and colleagues for their color knowledge task ( -33, -36, 16). The proximity of these peak voxel coordinates across studies suggests that our
memory task, and other tasks which have been used in prior research, are both tapping
into color knowledge retrieval processes, though again, there was no main effect of
chromaticity (t[17] = 0.38, p = 0.71).
Several prior studies have reported that this region of the fusiform gyrus is active
during color perception (that is, more active during perception of chromatic compared to
achromatic stimuli) in addition to during retrieval of color (Simmons et al., 2007). We
did not observe this effect in the analyses we reported above; although we used their
same procedure and stimuli to manipulate color perception, there were some differences
in our analyses. Subsequently, we repeated the analysis of the perception data without
including global signal as a covariate in the model (following from Simmons et al.,
2007), and this new analysis does show a chromaticity effect in color perception in the
fusiform gyrus. In this functionally-defined fusiform region, there was a trend towards a
chromaticity effect on the knowledge retrieval task, though it did not reach statistical
significance (t(17) = 1.82, p = 0.09). Finally, in applying a similar approach as described
earlier — in which we identified the top voxels in ventral temporal regions that were
involved in both tasks, irrespective of threshold — in analyses without global signal in
the models, we observed near (but not direct) voxel overlap between task activation (in
memory) and chromaticity (in perception).
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In sum, these additional analyses suggest a role for the left fusiform gyrus in color
perception and memory. However, they also show that the pattern of activation in this
region is different in a number of ways from that observed in the left lingual region,
being more correlated with global signal, and less sensitive to chromaticity in memory.
We will return to these differences and their possible implications below.

Discussion
The results of this study demonstrate that a chromaticity effect (namely, greater
activation to colored than grayscale stimuli), which has already been documented in color
perception, is paralleled in memory retrieval. This tests an important prediction of
sensorimotor models of memory, which propose that the same processes invoked during
perception of a sensory property will also contribute to memory of that property.
Therefore, under these models, if there are different neural patterns associated with the
perception of chromatic versus achromatic stimuli, this difference should emerge during
memory retrieval. Our data confirm this prediction. This experimental strategy could be
applied to many other sensorimotor properties, in order to test for similarities between
perception (or action) and memory processes.
Somewhat to our surprise, the chromaticity effect on memory was strongest in a
very posterior region, namely the left lingual gyrus. This was the one region where we
found direct overlap of voxels activated by both perception and memory tasks. Ventral
temporal regions, and in particular the left fusiform gyrus, showed robust task activation
during the knowledge retrieval task, with a peak voxel coordinate that was only 3mm
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from the peak voxel reported by Simmons and colleagues (2007). However, the
chromaticity effect in the left fusiform gyrus associated with the memory task was weak
at best, and evident only as a marginally significant difference in an analysis without
global signal in the model. These findings suggest that future research might fruitfully
focus on possible differences between posterior (i.e., lingual) and more anterior (i.e.,
fusiform) regions of the visual system.
As noted, the decision to include global signal in the model did not affect the
detection of the perceptual chromaticity effect in the left lingual region, but did have an
impact in the left fusiform region. Often, considerations about inclusion of the global
signal in a model are based on the correlation between the global signal covariate and the
task covariate — because when the two are highly correlated, teasing apart the effects of
each becomes nearly impossible (see Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito (1998) for further
discussion). The correlation between global signal and the chromaticity covariate in the
perceptual task ranged from 0.11-0.31 across subjects, though of course the co-linearity
across predictors in the model is the same for the two regions in question here.
What could differ, however, is the correlation between the global signal and the
regionally-specific signal. In other words, if activation in the fusiform region is more
strongly correlated with the global signal than is activation in the lingual region, then the
inclusion of global signal in the model could differentially affect the fusiform findings.
This was indeed the pattern that we observed in these two regions (p < 0.01). The fact
that global signal explains more variance in the fusiform (average t = 10.8) than in the
lingual region (average t = 7.88) could explain why the inclusion of global signal has
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differential effects in these two regions.
We find this idea interesting in light of an argument made in Beauchamp et al.
(1999), namely that fusiform activation may depend on the attentional demands of the
task. For example, previous work has demonstrated that the fusiform gyrus is activated
during an attentionally demanding color perception task, but not during passive viewing
tasks (see Beauchamp et al., 1999). In other research, we have shown that activation in
this region during color retrieval is modulated by specificity of the color information
required in the task (Hsu et al., 2011). If activation in the fusiform gyrus does reflect a
more general attentional process, then it is conceivable that activity there would be
correlated with a spatially-distributed attentional network, which could in turn lead to a
higher correlation with global signal — because the global signal is the average of every
voxel’s response at a given time point. More generally, this discussion highlights the
potential value of comparing models that include or omit covariates which are generally
considered to have “no interest.” As shown above, global signal might indeed be of
interest.
Turning to the memory data, we found a strong effect of chromaticity in the
lingual gyrus which is co-localized with the perceptual chromaticity effect, but a weak
effect, at best, in the fusiform gyrus. We find the absence of a chromaticity effect in the
fusiform gyrus particularly interesting, given that the memory task resulted in robust
activation in this region. How might this area be contributing to the process of memory
retrieval, particularly in light of its association with color perception as reviewed above?
We think there are two plausible explanations, though we should also note with caution
	
  
	
  

30

that the interaction between chromaticity and region did not reach significance (p = 0.19),
so we do not have evidence that the patterns we observed in fusiform and lingual regions
are reliably different. For this reason, these ideas should be understood as suggestions for
future research aimed at distinguishing the response properties of these regions.
Firstly, echoing a suggestion in Simmons et al. (2007), the posterior lingual area
might be generating a purely sensory response to any colored stimuli, regardless of task,
whereas the more anterior fusiform area may be more directly involved in the process of
color categorization. The luminance judgment for our color knowledge task did not
explicitly require subjects to categorize color stimuli, which may explain the lack of a
robust chromaticity effect in fusiform gyrus. Hence, the two areas can be understood as
supporting different processes that are invoked to varying degrees during different
perceptual and memory tasks. This account leads to the testable prediction that
chromaticity effects would be observed during a memory retrieval task that required
greater attention to color categories.
A second possibility concerns the nature of the representations of different colors
in these two regions. An area could be said to represent color, if the response in that area
varies as a function of variation in color. One such variation would be that chromatic
stimuli, as a group, tend to elicit a different pattern of activity (in this case, a higher
magnitude response) than do achromatic stimuli. Observation of a chromaticity effect
requires that within-class differences (that is, variation between different colors, among
the chromatic stimuli, or between different shades of gray, among the achromatic stimuli)
are smaller that the between-class differences.
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However, there are many possible representations of color that would not lead to a
chromaticity effect. The fusiform region could be a “color area”, in that it codes the color
of stimuli in both perception and memory, but one in which the difference in the
representation of, say, purple and green stimuli is just as big as the difference between
purple and gray stimuli. There are now methods for analyzing fMRI data that are wellsuited for characterizing pattern similarity, and which could fruitfully be applied to the
study of color representation (e.g., Haushofer, Livingstone, & Kanwisher, 2008; O’Toole,
Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005; Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons,
2009). For example, we would predict that when discriminating different categories of
chromatic stimuli such as purple from green (in perception or memory), classification
performance should be worse in early visual areas (e.g. lingual gyrus) than it is in
downstream visual areas (e.g., fusiform gyrus).
Finally, there are two aspects of our stimulus set and task choice that warrant
some further discussion. First, by using a luminance judgment task, the observed
chromaticity effect might be attributed to additional processing in the chromatic
condition. That is, by asking subjects to judge luminance, they may have needed to
“convert” chromatic items to grayscale prior to responding. By contrast, this step is
unnecessary for achromatic items. Thus, greater activity in the chromatic condition may
be the result of a task-dependent process that contributed to differential activation
between chromatic and achromatic knowledge retrieval. Second, chromatic items might
sample a larger area of color space than achromatic items. That is, the colors of
achromatic items were always either white, gray, or black. Chromatic items, by contrast,
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were sampled from any colors except for white, gray, or black. Further, to better match
conditions in terms of RT, we intentionally constructed some achromatic pairs to be
closer in terms of perceived luminance (e.g., a luminance judgment for CHALK-KNIFE
is more difficult than for CHALK-PIANO), and we constructed some chromatic pairs to
be further apart in terms of perceived luminance (e.g., a luminance judgment for
SCHOOL BUS-FUDGE is easier than for SCHOOL BUS-BASKETBALL).
As a result, no trials in either condition used two items from the same color family
(e.g., two red items). Thus, our reported effects may be the result of a larger color space
sampling in the chromatic condition, relative to the achromatic condition. A future study
could control for color space variance in the two conditions by asking luminance of two
red items (e.g., STRAWBERRY-BRICK) versus luminance of two gray items (e.g.,
CONCRETE-QUARTER).
In summary, our study is the first to examine whether a well-established
difference in the perception of chromatic and achromatic stimuli is paralleled during
memory retrieval, in the absence of any visual information. These results provide
evidence supporting sensorimotor models of semantic memory, by demonstrating
commonalities between color perception and color knowledge in early areas of the
cortical visual system. More importantly, our findings show that there may be multiple
areas of overlap between perception and memory, though the functions of those areas
may be distinct. The chromaticity effect described here may tap into some of these
functional differences, and future research may elucidate some of these distinctions
further.
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Table 2.2. List of stimuli used in the color knowledge retrieval task.
Abstract
boredom-passion
torque-hope
confidence-irritation
liberty-wrath
genius-atrocity
sin-fidelity
vanity-evidence
tyranny-safety
pact-fraud
effort-banality
antagonism-joy
adultery-beauty
fission-trust
penalty-sanctuary
etiquette-panic
frenzy-discourse
humor-sin
dogma-wisdom
tragedy-friendship
brutality-savant
banquet-anxiety
welcome-fear
harm-glory
hindrance-insight
danger-salvation
strength-upheaval
haven-regret
enactment-sorrow
annoyance-talent
romance-ego
reason-indolence
ridicule-dynasty
equality-complexity
greed-delight
hostility-idol
virtue-poverty
envy-amusement
paradigm-threat
livelihood-misery
rigidity-fervour
tradition-wish
success-malice
	
  
	
  

Chromatic
brandy-dandelion
biscuit-marinara
leaf-tabasco
emerald -moose
pool table-daffodil
broom-windex
desk-honeydew
balloon-trombone
oak-rubber ducky
gums-bison
plum-relish
beaver-pear
denim-lemon
broccoli-egg yolk
monkey-mint
peanut-zucchini
cheese-iced tea
tiger-pretzel
highlighter-log
butter-violin
seaweed-trumpet
saxophone-tomato
cigar-sunflower
cranberry-latte
apricot-wood
stool-taxi
lemonade-garden hose
bee-fire truck
sun-tortoise
jeans-canary
chocolate-guacamole
barrel-cabbage
apple-pencil
mango-scotch
fudge-ham
cantaloupe-deer
chili-yam
kiwi-barn
tuba-wreath
gingersnap-ocean
heart-chick
basketball-celery
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Achromatic
grill-cream
skunk-vanilla
flute-poppy seed
steel-rabbit
soap-dime
envelope-tire
fly-pin
mayonnaise-concrete
rhinoceros-soot
knife-marshmallow
dalmatian-paste
pillow-paperclip
bone-raven
dolphin-onion
scissors-milk
aluminum-porcelain
needle-paper
penguin-rice
flour-thimble
baseball-ebony
cigarette-stone
armor-cauliflower
cement-garlic
fork-salt
crow-spoon
eggshell-whale
hubcap-dove
sail-eight ball
pliers-sheep
manatee-pearl
cotton-elephant
beetle-sword
hearse-lab coat
whistle-piano
alfredo-snow
ivory-tack
cloud-staple
cue ball -panther
swan-radio
screw-stork
yogurt-quarter
glue-tuxedo

Abstract
luck-woe
skill-grief
unrest-tact
aptitude-revenge
relief-fallacy
sanitation-mischief
triumph-suspicion
liberty-spite
skill-irritation
indolence-haven
hope-fraud
grief-idol
wrath-virtue
banquet-strength
sanitation-fear
adultery-livelihood
unrest-sanctuary
humor-regret
annoyance-safety
envy-deity
torque-woe
fission-glory
tyranny-wish
genius-ego
rigidity-talent
enactment-confidence
ridicule-fervour
banality-evidence
luck-threat
penalty-beauty
hostility-pact
success-complexity
aptitude-suspicion
equality-dynasty
harm-savant
friendship-vanity
passion-danger
effort-malice
salvation-fraud
frenzy-etiquette
panic-romance
dogma-tact
wisdom-poverty
	
  
	
  

Chromatic
football-mustard
cello-corn
leather-salmon
brownie-salsa
pea-cherry
pumpkin-table
brick-bubblegum
highlighter-shamrock
dandelion-tomato
broom-chick
peanut-saxophone
apricot-gingersnap
barn-sun
oak-denim
monkey-trumpet
cardboard-tuba
pencil-cigar
cello-gums
salsa-football
balloon-moose
mustard-wreath
emerald-leather
butter-fudge
rubber ducky-brandy
biscuit-brick
cabbage-chili
tabasco-log
celery-table
guacamole-beaver
barrel-salmon
relish-fire truck
brownie-yam
marinara-plum
deer-cherry
ham-sunflower
chocolate-pear
iced tea-cantaloupe
scotch-honeydew
violin-egg yolk
taxi cab-wood
heart-bee
desk-tiger
pumpkin-windex
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Achromatic
wrench-oil
lamb-limousine
napkin-tin
sugar-shield
gun-golf ball
shark-spider
treadmill-refrigerator
oil-paper
rhinoceros-envelope
gun-refrigerator
steel-snow
spider-dolphin
armor-salt
treadmill-thimble
tin-cue ball
hubcap-dove
soot-shark
knife-flour
pliers-lab coat
crow-yogurt
whistle-mayonnaise
eight ball-onion
dime-cream
flute-milk
quarter-dalmatian
grill-soap
raven-pillow
stone-stork
screw-lamb
poppy seed-chain
whale-paste
penguin-wrench
spoon-glue
beetle-sugar
panther-cement
radio-pearl
scissors-cloud
aluminum-cotton
concrete-cauliflower
ebony-rice
tuxedo-pin
hearse-porcelain
manatee-eggshell

Abstract
anxiety-tradition
upheaval-discourse
reason-sin
hindrance-amusement
paradigm-boredom
tragedy-insight
greed-joy
triumph-revenge
fidelity-brutality
welcome-mischief
delight-fallacy
relief-antagonism
sorrow-trust

	
  
	
  

Chromatic
mint-ocean
basketball-broccoli
latte-apple
seaweed-mango
toast-canary
garden hose-pretzel
cranberry-lemon
leaf-corn
stool-cheese
jeans-zucchini
pea-daffodil
trombone-pool table
tortoise-bubblegum
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Achromatic
needle-marshmallow
fork-garlic
elephant-vanilla
tire-sheep
fly-alfredo
staple-napkin
limousine-sail
lead-bone
sword-ivory
piano-rabbit
paperclip-baseball
tack-cigarette
shield-golf ball

Table 2.3. Regions identified from the 27 maxima in the exploratory, whole-brain
analysis. Coordinates are in Talairach space and are given for the peak voxel (local
maximum) with corresponding t-value. Regions were labeled by visual inspection. Note
that these t-values denote response to chromatic versus achromatic perceptual stimuli,
whereas the differences in signal changes plotted in Figure 2.4 denote response to
chromatic versus achromatic conceptual stimuli.

Region
L Postcentral Gyrus
R Supramarginal Gyrus
R Superior Parietal Gyrus
L Superior Parietal Gyrus
Superior Parietal Gyrus
Precuneus
R Superior Parietal Gyrus
L Superior Parietal Gyrus
R Superior Occipital Gyrus
R Cuneus
L Cuneus
L Superior Occipital Gyrus
L Superior Occipital Gyrus
L Superior Occipital Gyrus
Cuneus
R Cuneus
L Cuneus
R Cuneus
L Lingual Gyrus
L Parahippocampal Gyrus
L Superior Lingual Gyrus
R Inferior Lingual Gyrus
R Inferior Lingual Gyrus
L Inferior Lingual Gyrus
L Inferior Lingual Gyrus
L Fusiform Gyrus
R Fusiform Gyrus

	
  
	
  

X coor
-53
45
12
-9
0
0
9
-18
27
12
-6
-6
-18
-15
0
9
-3
3
-9
-12
-9
15
33
-15
-9
-27
30

Y coor
-29
-21
-85
-83
-83
-77
-92
-92
-92
-89
-89
-98
-98
-101
-87
-102
-99
-96
-87
-41
-91
-76
-73
-70
-79
-65
-62
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Z coor
52
41
40
37
32
32
30
27
22
22
22
20
18
10
9
8
7
7
4
0
-8
-9
-9
-9
-11
-12
-15

Peak t Value
4.06
5.57
4.95
5.34
5.13
4.99
7.51
6.06
4.32
8.36
4.65
6.46
7.88
4.72
7.67
5.06
4.63
4.94
8.60
4.89
4.50
5.22
6.21
4.44
5.35
4.73
5.68

Figure Captions

Figure 2.1. Examples of stimuli from each task. (top) For the color knowledge task,
subjects made a luminance judgment on named pairs of chromatic or achromatic objects.
As a baseline, subjects made goodness judgments on pairs of abstract concepts. (bottom)
For the color perception task, subjects judged whether the wedges making up a chromatic
or achromatic wheel were sequentially ordered from lightest to darkest.

Figure 2.2. Co-localization of color perception and color knowledge. We independently
identified the 50 most active voxels in posterior occipital regions for color perception
(red) and color knowledge (blue). Voxels active for both tasks are shown in green.

Figure 2.3. Exploratory analyses. (top) Group random-effects whole-brain analysis
shows voxels responding more to chromatic than achromatic visual stimuli at p < 0.001
(uncorrected) threshold. (bottom) Group random-effects whole brain analysis shows
voxels responding more to chromatic that achromatic conceptual knowledge at p < 0.01
(uncorrected) threshold. The 27 fROIs were identified within these active regions.

Figure 2.4. Signal change trends in ventral but not dorsal regions. For each of the 27
fROIs identified in the exploratory whole-brain analysis, we assessed percent signal
change by comparing each condition of the color knowledge task to baseline. We then
subtracted the values from achromatic from chromatic, and plotted the difference. All
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ventral color perception regions showed greater response to chromatic than achromatic
knowledge retrieval, but this pattern was not consistently observed in dorsal regions that
were involved in the color perception task. Note that these values correspond to activity
during the conceptual task, and coordinates are plotted in order from dorsal to ventral
according to Talairach z-coordinates. For full Talairach coordinate listings,
corresponding regions, and t-values of these maxima to the perceptual task, see Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.4.
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CHAPTER 3: Color, context, and cognitive style: variations in color knowledge
retrieval as a function of task and subject variables
Hsu, N. S., Kraemer, D. J. M., Oliver, R. T., Schlichting, M. L., & Thompson-Schill, S. L.
(2011). Color, context, and cognitive style: variations in color knowledge retrieval as a
function of task and subject variables. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(9), 25442557.
Abstract
Neuroimaging tests of sensorimotor theories of semantic memory hinge on the extent to
which similar activation patterns are observed during perception and retrieval of objects
or object properties. The present study was motivated by the hypothesis that some of the
seeming discrepancies across prior studies of semantic memory related to color properties
may reflect flexibility in the systems responsible for conceptual and perceptual
processing of color. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that retrieval of color knowledge
can be influenced by both context, which is a task variable, and individual differences in
cognitive style, which are a subject variable. In Experiment 1, we provide fMRI evidence
for differential activity during color knowledge retrieval, by having subjects perform a
verbal task in which context encouraged them to retrieve more- or less-detailed
information about the colors of named common objects in a blocked experimental design.
We found greater activity in the left fusiform gyrus during retrieval of color knowledge
with a higher level of detail. We also assessed preference for verbal or visual cognitive
style, and found that brain activity in the left lingual gyrus significantly correlated with
preference for a visual cognitive style. In Experiment 2, stimuli were presented more
quickly, in a random order, and in the auditory modality, and we were able to replicate
many of the effects from Experiment 1. This illustration of some of the factors that can
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influence color knowledge retrieval leads to the conclusion that tests of conceptual and
perceptual overlap should consider variation in both of these processes.
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Introduction
Sensorimotor theories of semantic memory posit that object knowledge is
organized in a distributed, modality-specific fashion, and is stored in or near the brain
regions that are associated with perception of and action with objects (Allport, 1985;
Barsalou, 1999; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). A large body of behavioral,
neuroimaging, and neurophysiological research has provided evidence for these theories
(for review, see Martin, 2007 or Thompson-Schill, 2003). In particular, neuroimaging
studies have demonstrated that retrieving knowledge of object features draws on similar
neural substrates as perception in the same modality, as shown through vision (Chao &
Martin, 1999; Kosslyn et al., 1995; Martin et al., 1995; Simmons et al., 2007), hearing
(Hughes et al., 2001; Kraemer et al., 2005; Wheeler et al., 2000; Yoo et al., 2001), and
action (Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk et al., 2004; Kellenbach et al., 2003; Oliver et al.,
2009; Yee et al., 2010).
The current investigation focuses on vision, and in particular color vision. Color is
crucial to object identification, is often the feature used to distinguish between two
otherwise similar objects (e.g., lemons and limes), and can be characterized by both
continuous values along multiple dimensions (such as hue, saturation, and luminance), or
more coarsely in a categorical fashion. Moreover, color is a feature that is only perceived
through the visual modality, unlike other features of object appearance such as shape or
size.
The methods used in prior research on color perception and color retrieval have
varied widely, as have the results of those investigations. Brain regions sensitive to color
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perception have been identified through the use of passively viewed colored versus
grayscale Mondrians (Chao & Martin, 1999; Howard et al., 1998), or while making
luminance judgments on visual stimuli (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007).
While active brain regions tend to include lateralized or bilateral fusiform and lingual
gyri, as yet there is no overwhelming consensus on which brain areas are most closely
involved in color perception. Tasks used to identify the brain regions involved in retrieval
of color knowledge have included a similarity task of two named objects in the same
color family (Howard et al., 1998), naming colors of objects presented as achromatic line
drawings (Chao & Martin, 1999; Martin et al., 1995), or verifying colors of objects
(Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2001; Simmons et al., 2007). In addition to lateralized or
bilateral fusiform and lingual gyri being active, a posterior inferior temporal network can
also be activated during retrieval (Kellenbach et al., 2001). The results from prior
research have generally been interpreted as evidence supporting sensorimotor theories of
semantic memory, but there are discrepancies among studies which might undermine this
conclusion. For example, one study found no evidence of overlapping responses to color
perception and color retrieval (Chao & Martin, 1999), while another analysis found direct
overlap between the two, albeit only in the left fusiform gyrus (Simmons et al., 2007).
Past work investigating the semantic memory attributes of color has tended to
investigate the overlap between conceptual and perceptual color processing by posing the
question: “Does color knowledge retrieval activate the color perception area?” Instead,
we propose reframing the question as: “What factors influence color knowledge retrieval,
and under what circumstances do these factors influence the extent of overlap between
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color knowledge retrieval and color perception?" We propose that differences in the
literature may also be partly due to external influences on retrieval of color knowledge,
namely task factors and individual factors.
To motivate the relevance of task, or context, factors for color retrieval, consider
the following two contexts. First, imagine that you are trying to avoid eating strawberries
as you pick through a fruit salad comprising blueberries, blackberries, and strawberries.
As you plan your search of the bowl of fruit, you will need to know that the strawberries
are the red bits in the bowl. Now instead, imagine that you are trying to avoid eating the
strawberries in a fruit salad that also includes raspberries, watermelon, and cherries.
Dodging the red pieces will no longer help you, and instead, you need to recall the
specific shade of red of the strawberry. In other words, the context (created by the other
fruits in the bowl) changes the type of color information you retrieve about the fruits.
This is the contextual difference that we have attempted to capture with our task
manipulation.
Turning to individual factors, differences in cognitive style may also play an
important role in the representation that is retrieved by a given individual. A cognitive
style is a psychological dimension that represents consistencies in how an individual
acquires and processes information (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005).
Different individuals process certain types of information differently, for instance by
having a preference for learning through pictures or through words, and this idea has
been incorporated into many theories in various avenues of psychological research (for
review, see Kozhevnikov, 2007; Kraemer, Rosenberg, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). For
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the experiments described in this study, we use the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire
(VVQ) (Kirby, Moore, & Schofield, 1988) to identify propensities for visual or verbal
cognition. A key difference between task factors and individual factors is that the latter,
such as visualizing preferences, are described as being stable over time, whereas the
former can vary on a trial-to-trial basis. Both of these types of factors may affect
components of the color knowledge retrieval process, suggesting that it may be more
dynamic and complicated than had previously been believed.
For the current investigation, we examined the effects of task factors and
individual factors on color retrieval by implicitly varying the retrieval context and by
assessing individual preferences for cognitive style. In Experiment 1, subjects performed
a verbal task in which they judged the color similarity of three named objects. The
composition of the object groups encouraged retrieval of either object colors from the
same color category (e.g. three red items) or from different color categories (e.g. two red
items and a yellow item). These object groups were thus meant to encourage retrieval of
more- or less-detailed color knowledge. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), we measured brain activity during retrieval, controlling for difficulty by covarying out reaction time. We observed effects of both task factors and individual factors,
although in different regions: We found that activity in the left fusiform gyrus was
significantly greater when retrieving and discriminating object colors from the same
versus different color category. The lingual gyrus was responsive to the task (compared
to baseline), but there was no significant difference in activity between conditions.
However, activity in this region (and task performance) significantly correlated with
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visual cognitive style preference, as measured by the self-reported Verbalizer-Visualizer
Questionnaire (VVQ).
Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1. For this
test, we also varied the level of detail required for color knowledge, while also making
two important changes to the experimental procedures. First, we used auditory rather than
visual stimuli, to ensure that any effects were solely due to the retrieval of visual
knowledge, and did not result from response to the visually-presented words. Second, we
used a randomized rather than blocked manipulation of the color task, in order to
minimize the contribution of state effects on the retrieval process. Even with these
changes, Experiment 2 replicated many of the findings of Experiment 1, most notably by
showing activation in the left fusiform gyrus. Additionally, there was a significant
positive correlation between the self-reported VVQ and task performance. Overall, our
findings in Experiments 1 and 2 support the notion that retrieval of color knowledge
representations relies on neural substrates which are similar to those used in color
perception, and also that the degree to which these systems overlap can be influenced
both by context and by cognitive style.

Experiment 1: Methods
Participants
For Experiment 1, twelve healthy subjects (6 males, average age = 22.8 years,
range = 19–30 years) participated. All subjects in both experiments provided written
informed consent to participate and received monetary compensation in return for their
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participation. The human subjects review board at the University of Pennsylvania
approved all experimental procedures.

Materials
For each trial of both experiments, subjects judged the similarity of three named
objects, indicating which of the two objects was more similar to the third object in terms
of color. The conditions of interest were varied, such that in order to arrive at a correct
answer, varying levels of detailed color information would be required. For some tests,
we required subjects to compare objects drawn from different color categories, or
between-color categories (BCC), for instance by comparing PAPRIKA and PENCIL to
LADYBUG, where less-detailed color information would suffice. For other trials, we
required subjects to compare objects drawn from the same color category, or within-color
category (WCC), for instance by comparing BUTTER and EGG YOLK to SCHOOL
BUS, where more-detailed color information becomes necessary.
The 300 objects used in the experiments were rated for color agreement (> 66%)
by an independent group of 50 subjects, drawn from the same population as the study
sample. Further, in order to alleviate ambiguity in WCC trials and to create WCC trials
with agreement for the correct answer, these 50 subjects performed an additional rating
task. For this task, they rated the color similarity of pairs of all objects within a color
category, and WCC trials were created by pairing two objects (rated for high color
similarity) with a third object (rated for low color similarity). Once created, the trials in
both conditions of interest were normed in an independent group of 25 subjects for
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accuracy and differences in response time (RT).
Because a substantial portion of the objects used in these experiments did not
have listings in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1987), as prioritizing for
high color agreement constrained our object names list, we felt that the conditions could
not be accurately matched in terms of familiarity and lexical frequency. Thus, we used a
lexical decision task (in which all of the words referred to concrete objects) as a proxy
measure of familiarity and frequency, as has been used in similar contexts for prior
research (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006). A separate set of 25 subjects drawn
from the same population as the study sample completed the lexical decision task, during
which they verified whether each presented word referred to a real world object or not.
Each of the 300 words used in the neuroimaging experiments was randomly presented
individually, and intermixed with 300 pronounceable pseudowords (Rastle, Harrington,
& Coltheart, 2002) that were matched with the 300 real words for letter length and
number of syllables. RT and accuracy measures were collected, which did not differ
across the two conditions of interest. To sum, in Experiment 1, the conditions were
matched for lexical frequency and familiarity (as measured by lexical decision RTs),
number of letters, number of phonemes, number of syllables, and color agreement.
No more than one week before the scanning session, subjects came to the lab to
fill out relevant paperwork, provide informed consent, and to become acquainted with the
tasks by performing practice versions. Additionally, they were administered the
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ), in a manner identical to that reported
previously (Kraemer et al., 2009).
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Procedure, Experiment 1:
At the beginning of each trial, two words appeared at the bottom of the screen for
4000 msec, and then a third word replaced a fixation cross at the top of the screen (see
Figure 1). At this point, the subjects’ task was to decide which of the two bottom words
was more similar in real world color to the top word. Subjects indicated their response
with a button press within a 4500 msec response window, during which time all three
words were visible. We collected response latencies to include as a covariate in all fMRI
analyses, in order to control for differences in time on task across conditions. At the end
of the trial, a fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 500 msec, before the
onset of the next trial, for a total trial duration of 9000 msec.
Trials from the WCC and BCC conditions were blocked in Experiment 1 as
follows: we presented 5 trials of one condition (45 sec) followed by 45 seconds of
fixation (“baseline”), and then 5 trials of the other condition followed by 45 seconds of
fixation, and so on. In each of two functional scans (or runs), subjects completed 5 WCC
blocks and 5 BCC blocks, for a total of 50 trials per conditions across the two scans, with
an equivalent amount of fixation time. To reduce variability across subjects associated
with task order, trials were presented in the same order for all subjects, beginning with a
WCC block. Prior to scanning, subjects completed five practice trials of each condition.
We used E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) to present stimuli and to
collect response data.
After subjects completed both color retrieval scans, we administered a “functional
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localizer” in order to identify brain regions involved in color perception, so that we could
compare regions that are affected by task or subject factors during color retrieval to
regions that respond to color perception in the same group of subjects. Participants saw
blocks of the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue stimuli, in which they judged whether
chromatic or achromatic color wheels were sequentially ordered from lightest to darkest.
The methods and stimuli for this task were identical to those that were used previously by
Simmons and colleagues (Simmons et al., 2007) and have previously been used to
identify brain regions involved in color perception (e.g., Beauchamp et al., 1999).

Image Acquisition
We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with an 8-channel
head coil and foam padding to secure the head in position. After we acquired T1weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size =
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.000 mm), each subject performed the color knowledge
retrieval task, followed by the color perception task, while undergoing blood oxygen
dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected 912 sets of 42 slices
using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000 msec, TE = 30 msec,
FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm). At least 9 seconds
of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each functional scan to allow
for steady-state magnetization; no stimuli were presented and no fMRI data were
collected during this initial time period.
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Neuroimaging Data Analysis
We analyzed the data off-line using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject were processed using the
FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence; motion corrected
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first
functional image as a reference; and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. The fMRI data were smoothed using a
9mm full-width half-max (FWHM) Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing
for each subject, a power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency
function, and this model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the
functional data (Zarahn et al., 1997).
We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each
subject’s data, in which the conditions of interest were modeled as a block and convolved
with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several covariates of no interest (global
signal, scan effects, movement spikes) were included in the model. The response latency
for each trial was also included as a covariate of no interest, to address any confounds of
difficulty or “time on task”; in other words, effects of condition reported below describe
differences between conditions that cannot be explained by RT differences alone. From
this model, we computed parameter estimates for each condition (compared to baseline)
at each voxel. These parameter estimates were included in the group-level random effects
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analyses described below.
To establish functionally defined regions of interest (fROIs) in which to assess the
effects of task and individual factors on color retrieval, we first performed a group-level
random effects analysis, in which we compared brain activity for both conditions of
interest to the fixation baseline. Note that, because the fROIs are defined in this way, they
are unbiased with regard to the test of interest, namely whether there are differences in
activation between the two conditions. Next, from the set of fROIs that emerged from this
analysis, we identified the peak cluster of voxels from lingual and fusiform gyri, as these
two regions have been implicated in color perception and color knowledge retrieval
(Beauchamp et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 1999; Martin, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007). In
order to create fROIs of comparable size across regions, we did not use a pre-determined
threshold, but instead adjusted the threshold that yielded approximately 100 maximallyresponsive voxels in each of these regions. (For the remaining fROIs about which we did
not have a priori hypotheses, we assessed effects using an approach better suited for
exploratory analyses, which we discuss in the section titled “Exploratory whole-brain
analyses” below.) Finally, within each of these fROIs, we calculated parameter estimates
for each subject, for each condition, on the spatially-averaged time series (across the 100
voxels in the fROI), and used these parameter estimates to assess the effects of task and
individual factors on color retrieval (see Figure 4). Task effects were assessed using a
paired t-test of the difference between the WCC parameter and the BCC parameter, and
subject effects were assessed using a Pearson’s correlation between these values and the
difference scores on the VVQ.
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Experiment 1: Results
Behavioral Results
Each dimension of the VVQ ranges from -20 to 20. Although scores for each
dimension were generally positive, we measured preference for a visual or verbal
cognitive style in terms of the difference between the two, calculated by subtracting
verbal from visual scores. This difference score will be reported throughout the paper as
“Vis-Verb.” Difference scores ranged from -5 to 15 (M = 4.3, SD = 7.15).
The average response time (RT, in ms) for correct trials in both experimental
conditions was 1485.08 (SD = 678.66). As expected, the inherent difference in difficulty
between the two experimental conditions resulted in notable RT differences (BCC: M =
1332.25, SD = 651.91; WCC: M = 1720.17, SD = 669.27; t(11) = 4.74, p < 0.001). VisVerb scores were not correlated with RT (r = -0.38, p = 0.20). Accuracy across
conditions was fairly high (84%), but lower for the more difficult WCC condition (BCC:
95%; WCC: 74%; t(11) = 13.40, p < 0.001). As seen in Figure 3a, accuracy difference
scores (calculated by subtracting accuracy on the BCC trials from the WCC trials)
significantly correlated with Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.58, p < 0.05). This result suggests
that subjects who prefer the visual cognitive style tended to perform better on trials in
which object representations of higher detail were retrieved.

Imaging Results
Results are shown in Figure 4a. In the left fusiform region (100 voxels; t = 6.96,
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Talairach coordinates: -36, -47, -13, BA 37), activation was significantly greater during
WCC blocks (mean % signal change = 0.53 %, SD = 0.208 %) than during BCC blocks
(mean % signal change = 0.40 %, SD = 0.14 %; t(11) = 4.02, p = 0.002). A weak but nonsignificant positive correlation also existed between the magnitude of the condition effect
(calculated as the difference in signal change between the two conditions) and Vis-Verb
scores (r = 0.35, p = 0.13). The finding of task-dependent levels of activity in the left
fusiform region during color retrieval tends to support our hypothesis that context can
influence the color knowledge retrieval process.
In the left lingual region (119 voxels; t = 5.5, Talairach coordinates: -15, -85, -3,
BA 18), there was significant activation in both conditions, but no difference between
conditions (WCC: mean = 0.28 %, SD = 0.16 %; BCC: mean = 0.29 %, SD = 0.14 %;
t(11) = -0.28, p = 0.83). Although there was not a reliable main effect of condition, there
was a significant positive correlation (see Figure 3c, r = 0.56, p = 0.03) between the
magnitude of the main effect and the Vis-Verb scores: Participants who preferred the
visual cognitive style showed higher levels of activation in the left lingual region, during
trials requiring retrieval of more-detailed color information. The finding that activity in
the left lingual region is correlated with an individual’s cognitive style supports our
hypothesis that individual factors can influence retrieval of color knowledge
representations.

Additional Analyses
A separate analysis investigated the overlap between color perception and color
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knowledge retrieval, by identifying ROIs of approximately 100 active voxels during the
color perception localizer in the same manner described for the color retrieval fROIs.
This method yielded two ROIs in the left fusiform (t = 5.05; 102 voxels) and the left
lingual gyrus (t = 6.5, 110 voxels). We then assessed the extent to which the regions
involved in color perception were also involved in the color knowledge task, by
overlaying the color perception ROIs with the color knowledge ROIs described above.
Here, we found that voxels involved in both color perception and color knowledge
retrieval overlapped in both left fusiform gyrus (10 voxels; Figure 5a) and left lingual
gyrus (2 voxels; Figure 5b). When we repeated our analyses of task and subject effects in
the regions which had been functionally defined to be involved in color perception, there
was a marginally significant increase for WCC versus BCC trials (t[11] = 2.20, p =
0.084), though the correlation between Vis-Verb scores and brain activity was not
statistically significant.
Separately, we also conducted an exploratory whole-brain analysis. Using a
group-level random effects analysis, we identified all clusters that surpassed a p < 0.001
(uncorrected) threshold for the task-baseline contrast (for clusters greater than 100
voxels, we picked only the peak 100 voxels, in order to maintain consistency with the
approach described above). This analysis revealed thirteen additional fROIs, and we
tested significance of the WCC-BCC contrast in each of those fROIs, as well as the
correlation of brain activity with Vis-Verb scores. These regions are reported in Table 1.
As can be seen, several other regions which were activated during color retrieval —
beyond those selected for their involvement in color perception — were also modulated
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by task and subject factors.

Experiment 1: Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence that task factors (context) and
individual factors (here, cognitive style), influence conceptual processing of color.
Activation during the color retrieval task was observed in two regions — the left fusiform
gyrus and the left lingual gyrus — that have already been reported in prior research on
color perception and memory, and which also overlapped with regions activated by our
color perception localizer in the same group of subjects. In these two regions, we found
evidence of effects of both task factors and individual factors. Specifically, in the left
fusiform region, we observed greater activation when color knowledge was retrieved in a
context that requires detailed or specific color information (i.e., WCC blocks) than in one
that does not (i.e., BCC blocks). And, in the left lingual region, the magnitude of this
effect was correlated with the degree to which subjects preferred the visual cognitive
style.
These findings paint a picture of color retrieval as a dynamic process, which can
vary according to both state and trait factors. The overlap between our two regions of
interest with voxels that respond to color perception (Figure 5) raises the possibility that
one aspect of color retrieval that varies is the extent to which early perceptual processes
are recruited during memory retrieval. Furthermore, we found that subjects who report a
visual cognitive style did better on WCC trials than those who did not; this result
suggests that there can be behavioral consequences of these variations in color retrieval
	
  
	
  

61

processes. Lastly, and more generally, these findings illustrate the utility of using both
group and individual analyses, a point to which we return in the General Discussion.
Early visual cortex has been shown to be recruited when retrieving highresolution details of object surface geometry (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). However, to
our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that retrieval of color knowledge
representations can differentially activate areas of the visual cortex that are also involved
in color perception. However, there is an alternative explanation of our findings in
Experiment 1, which focuses on our decision to present verbal stimuli in the visual
modality: The differences we observed between the WCC and BCC conditions could be
explained by a low-level, perceptual explanation unrelated to our hypothesis, if subjects
were scanning the visually-presented words differently during the two conditions — for
instance, if the WCC condition resulted in multiple fixations on each word, but the BCC
condition did not. In other words, although our general linear model statistically
controlled for response time differences, we cannot be certain that the same amount of
visual processing occurred per unit time. Experiment 2 addressed this concern by
presenting auditory rather than visual stimuli, so we could be certain that activation in
visual areas did not reflect processing of the words per se, but instead was indeed
focusing on the objects to which the words refer.
In Experiment 2, in addition to replicating our initial findings in the auditory
modality, we also wanted to address the time course of dynamic changes in knowledge
retrieval. In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with 45-second blocks that alternated
between retrieval of more- or less-detailed color knowledge representations. Thus, the
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results of Experiment 1 could reflect an anticipatory strategy sustained across an entire
block. In Experiment 2, we randomized the order of conditions on a trial-by-trial basis,
such that subjects were unable to predict the type of knowledge that would be required
prior to each trial. We also reduced each trial’s duration, in order to reduce the potential
impact of post-decision processes. Therefore, unlike in Experiment 1 where condition
differences could have been present even in the inter-trial interval of each block, in
Experiment 2 any observed differences in activation between conditions presumably
reflect the response to each individual set of stimuli.

Experiment 2: Methods
Participants
For Experiment 2, twelve healthy subjects (6 males, average age = 22.9 years,
range = 19–27 years) participated. No subjects participated in both experiments.

Materials
We selected 25 trials from each condition of Experiment 1 for use in Experiment
2. The items in the two conditions were matched for lexical frequency and familiarity (as
measured by lexical decision RTs), number of phonemes, and color agreement. Auditory
stimuli were recorded using Audacity (version 1.2.5) and filtered for noise. Because of
the inherent difficulty of hearing intelligible words above scanner noise made while
acquiring functional images, we modified sound files with a Matlab tool that boosts
sound frequencies normally masked by fMRI noise. Behavioral piloting of both file types
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revealed that the modified sound files were more intelligible than the original sound files.
To further facilitate word recognition in the scanner, subjects listened to all of the words
prior to scanning (once each, in a random order), and were told they would hear these
words again during the scan. They also generated the typical colors of these objects, and
naming latencies (as a proxy of familiarity for the scanned subjects) were compared
across the conditions of interest. There were no significant differences in naming
latencies across these conditions.

Procedure, Experiment 2:
On each trial, subjects heard three words and were instructed to decide which of
the first two named objects (spoken in a female voice) was more similar in color to the
third named object (spoken in a male voice). The trial structure, illustrated in Figure 2,
was as follows: At the beginning of each trial, a “READY?” prompt appeared on the
screen for 250 msec. Subjects then heard the names of three objects (the words’ onsets
were 1000 msec apart). Simultaneously with the onset of the third word, a visual prompt
of “COLOR?” appeared, and subjects had 3650 msec to respond with a button press.
Subjects were also told to press a third button if the words in a given triad were
unintelligible due to scanner noise, so we could eliminate those trials from our analyses.
The intertrial interval was 100 msec.
Each subject completed three scanning runs of the color retrieval task (6-7
minutes each), with 8 or 9 trials of each condition per run. We presented a unique trial
order to each subject, using Optseq2 (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq) to
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generate optimized pseudo-random stimulus presentation sequences. Experimental trials
were intermixed with jittered fixation periods averaging 6 seconds in length. (These trials
were also intermixed with filler trials on which subjects made judgments unrelated to
object color, which were not further analyzed.)
Additionally, the list of 300 objects contained four homophones (JEANS, PEA,
THYME, DOE) that when heard rather than seen, could potentially result in ambiguity
irrelevant for the task of interest. Thus, for Experiment 2, during acquisition of
anatomical images (and before functional imaging), each of the 300 words was visually
presented on the screen for 1000 msec. The words were randomly presented across
subjects, but the homophones always came first. Subjects were told that these words were
being presented to refresh their memories of the objects that would come up during the
task, and they were instructed to read each word silently to themselves.
The “functional localizer” to identify brain regions involved in color perception
was administered after the color knowledge task, exactly as in Experiment 1. All image
acquisition parameters were as in Experiment 1, although fewer volumes were collected
(693) and the overall duration of the experiment was shorter. Behavioral and functional
data were analyzed as in Experiment 1, except that we modeled each trial as a separate
event with a 6-second duration.

Experiment 2: Results
Behavioral Results
Vis-Verb scores ranged from -11 to 13 (M = 1.5, SD = 8.07) and did not differ
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from Experiment 1 scores (p = 0.37). The pattern of performance on the WCC and BCC
trials resembled that of Experiment 1: There was a small but still reliable difference
between conditions in RTs to correct trials (BCC: M = 1898.42, SD = 246.10; WCC: M =
2109.38, SD = 322.78; t(11) = 3.96, p = 0.002). Vis-Verb scores were not correlated with
RT (p = 0.97). Accuracy was high across conditions (81%) and varied between
conditions (BCC: 86%; WCC: 73%; t(11) = 5.09, p < 0.001). Accuracy differences
significantly correlated with Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.64, p = 0.03), as seen in Experiment 1
(and shown in Figure 3b).

Imaging Results
Functional ROIs were identified in the same manner as in Experiment 1. There
was substantial overlap between the fROIs obtained in Experiment 1 and those obtained
in Experiment 2, despite several variations in methodology (see Figure 6). Results are
shown in Figure 4b. In the left fusiform region (66 voxels, t = 5.5, Talairach coordinates:
-42 -65 -12, BA 19), activation was marginally greater during WCC trials (mean =
0.43%, SD = 0.15%) than during BCC trials (mean = 0.38%, SD = 0.19%; t(11) = 2.169,
p = 0.053); this effect was not reliably different in magnitude from that observed in
Experiment 1, p = 0.15. We also observed a marginally significant positive correlation
between the magnitude of the main effect and Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.46, p = 0.07). These
results establish that the effect of context on activation in the left fusiform cortex during
color retrieval is insensitive to the procedural variations between the two experiments.
In the left lingual region (91 voxels, t = 5.0, Talairach coordinates: -12 -87 -1, BA
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17), there was no significant difference in activation between WCC trials (mean = 0.81
%, SD = 0.29 %) and BCC trials (mean = 0.80 %, SD = 0.27 %; p = 0.75). As shown in
Figure 3d, we observed a weak positive correlation between the magnitude of the main
effect and Vis-Verb scores that did not differ in magnitude from the correlation observed
in Experiment 1 (p = -0.57), but which also did not reach significance here (p = 0.24).

Additional Analyses
An exploratory whole-brain analysis revealed several other fROIs that surpassed a
p < 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold at the whole brain level for the task-baseline contrast.
As in Experiment 1, within each of these fROIs, we then tested significance of the WCCBCC contrast, as well as the correlation between brain activity and Vis-Verb scores.
These data are reported in Table 1. Unlike Experiment 1, there were no reliable effects
(of either task or subject variables) in any of these regions. Interestingly, a fusiform
region which emerged during the exploratory analysis, more posterior to the fusiform
region identified in our primary analyses and closer to the lingual region identified
earlier, did not show the condition effect.

Experiment 2: Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated many of the results of Experiment 1, despite a number of
methodological changes. In Experiment 2, we (i) arranged stimuli in a randomized order,
preventing subjects from anticipating the trial condition; (ii) reduced the trial duration
from 9 s to 6 s; and, (iii) presented auditory rather than visual stimuli during color
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knowledge retrieval. Even with these changes, the main effects followed the same pattern
as had been observed in Experiment 1. Specifically, in both experiments, context (i.e.,
WCC versus BCC) affected the magnitude of activation for the left fusiform region
during color knowledge retrieval. In the left lingual region, there was no difference in
activity between conditions, though weak to moderate correlations were observed
between the condition effect and cognitive style preference. As noted previously, task
accuracy in both experiments was positively correlated with a cognitive style favoring
visual learning in the self-reported VVQ.
While there was substantial replication between the two experiments, there were a
few noteworthy differences. First, slightly different parts of the lingual region were
activated during the color retrieval task — the lingual region activated in Experiment 2
was more bilateral and anterior to that activated in Experiment 1, though there was some
overlap. While we have no compelling explanation for this difference, the higher level of
anterior activation in Experiment 2 is interesting because it is consistent with the
suggestion that anterior color perception regions involved in color knowledge retrieval
can be recruited based on task demand (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007).
Perhaps because of this localization difference, or perhaps because of one of the
methodological changes between the two experiments, the percent signal change in the
lingual region was much greater (in both conditions) in Experiment 2 than in Experiment
1, as seen in Figure 4. This pattern is interesting because ex ante, one might have
expected that auditory presentation conditions would result in lower levels of activation
for the lingual region.
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A second difference between the experiments concerns the correlation between
effect size and Vis-Verb scores in the lingual region. Though the correlation in
Experiment 2 replicated that of Experiment 1, the correlation was weaker and did not
reach statistical significance. This result is interesting because there are both
methodological and theoretical reasons to expect that the correlation in Experiment 1
might indeed be higher than in Experiment 2. First, there is generally less statistical
power in a randomized design than a blocked design (D’Esposito, 2006); under this
account, a more reliable correlation might have emerged if we had conducted a greater
number of trials to estimate the condition effect in each subject. Second, if the
consequence of having a more visual cognitive style is an increased likelihood of
deploying a visual strategy, then the correlation with cognitive style should be greater
under conditions that favor the use of anticipatory strategies. In Experiment 2, we
switched from a procedure that encouraged such strategies (slow trials in a predictable,
blocked sequence) to one that did not (fast trials in a randomly ordered sequence).
Consequently, it is not surprising that the correlation with cognitive style should be lower
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.

General Discussion
In this pair of studies, we explored factors that influence the retrieval of color
knowledge from memory. Specifically, we hypothesized that a task variable (context) and
a subject variable (here, cognitive style) might both have an effect on the process of color
retrieval, suggesting that this aspect of semantic memory may be more dynamic and
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flexible than previously assumed. The results of Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis
in two ways. First, we observed the effects of a task variable in the left fusiform gyrus,
where there was significantly greater activity during WCC trials than during BCC trials.
Second, in the left lingual gyrus, we saw the effects of a subject variable, in that the
magnitude of the condition effect on an individual subject level positively correlated with
subjects’ preference for a visual cognitive style, as measured by Vis-Verb scores.
Experiment 2 introduced several methodological changes; despite these changes, we
replicated many of the results from Experiment 1.

The nature of factors that influence conceptual processing of color
In both experiments, task accuracy was positively correlated with the degree of
visual cognitive style preference. Most subjects were more accurate on the BCC trials
than the WCC trials, though one subject showed greater accuracy in the WCC trials.
Nevertheless, subjects with the strongest visual-style preference as measured by the selfreported VVQ performed with almost equal accuracy, whereas subjects with the strongest
verbal-style preference displayed differences in accuracy approaching 30% (see Figure
3a-b). Considering the methodological differences between the two experiments, this
replication suggests an influence of cognitive style on task performance that is not
dependent on state effects within a task block (i.e., predicting task condition), nor on the
modality in which the information is presented (auditory or visual).
In both experiments, we saw more brain activity in the left fusiform during WCC
than during BCC trials, and these differences could not be explained by RT differences
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alone. This replication indicates that color retrieval processes can vary on a trial-to-trial
basis, driven by the immediate context. There may also be more sustained changes in
color retrieval strategies that emerge when the context is predictable and ongoing (as in
Experiment 1), but the findings in Experiment 2 indicate that color retrieval is a
dynamically changing collection of processes.
The ability to alter color retrieval processes in contextually-appropriate ways
might be thought of as a skill that varies across individuals. In accordance with this idea,
the positive correlation between signal change and Vis-Verb scores in the lingual gyrus
(robust in Experiment 1, weaker in Experiment 2) suggests an influence of cognitive style
on knowledge retrieval in an early color perception region (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Chao
& Martin, 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). For high visualizers (i.e., those with a higher VisVerb score), imagining object colors more closely resembles perception than for low
visualizers, and perhaps as a result, these subjects tended to perform better under
conditions that require more detailed color information (i.e., WCC trials). Moreover, this
result complements some recent findings that modality-specific cortical activity may
underlie processing related to visual and verbal cognitive styles (Kraemer et al., 2009).
More generally, one might ask why the fusiform gyrus shows the task effect,
whereas the lingual gyrus shows effects of the subject variable. Rather than ascribe
functional descriptions to these two regions, we believe that our demonstration that both
task and subject variables influence the color knowledge retrieval process can provide
support for the utility of using multiple approaches to understand the connections
between brain and behavior. In the experiments detailed here, we used average tendencies
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in a traditional ROI data analysis to demonstrate differential activation based on
discrimination of objects from the same or differing color category. Additionally, we
have found that the variability in these average tendencies is also meaningful with regard
to cognitive styles, highlighting the informativeness of an individual differences
approach. By using both types of analyses, our findings help to inform a richer
understanding of the factors influencing color knowledge retrieval, as has also been true
of other previous research (Epstein, Higgins, & Thompson-Schill, 2005; Omura, Aron, &
Canli, 2005).

Reconciling extant findings and representations that vary in “resolution”
Numerous neuroimaging studies have examined the extent of overlap between
regions activated by perception and memory of object properties, including color, in
order to evaluate sensorimotor theories of semantic memory. However, such studies have
produced rather mixed results. For example, one early experiment failed to detect overlap
between voxels activated by passive viewing of Mondrian-like displays (color
perception) as compared with voxels activated by color naming of achromatically
presented object drawings (color knowledge) (Chao & Martin, 1999). However, another
study found direct overlap in the left fusiform, using active hue sequencing (color
perception) and property verification (color knowledge) (Simmons et al., 2007). In the
current study, we observed overlap between color perception and color retrieval in the
fusiform gyrus (as in Simmons et al., 2007), as well as in the lingual gyrus (direct overlap
was not found in Simmons et al., 2007); however, we also found that the magnitude of
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activation in these regions varied across subjects and across contexts. This variability
may explain some of the inconsistencies in the literature.
Given these results, we propose that differences in results across studies may
reflect the existence of multiple types of color representations that vary in resolution.
Here, the term “resolution” is used to describe a representation in color space, where a
high-resolution color representation is one that contains fine detail (e.g. distinguishing
two shades of red), whereas a low-resolution representation contains coarse detail (e.g.,
red versus yellow). We designed our WCC and BCC trials in order to tap into these two
types of representations, respectively. Just as responses to visual stimuli can be described
as varying in abstraction, over low-level properties of the stimulus such as orientation,
size, and so on, it may also be useful to describe color knowledge at varying levels of
abstraction. In this way, the idea of multiple color representations is compatible with
sensorimotor theory, so that retrieval of color knowledge at different levels of resolution
would recruit perceptual representations with varying levels of abstraction. According to
this view, overlap between color perception and color knowledge retrieval would depend
on the “match” in the abstractness of the information represented in each case. It then
follows that the tasks implemented in previous neuroimaging studies may have tapped
representations at varying levels of resolution, resulting in slight differences in activation.
Although our results might suggest the existence of multiple color knowledge
representations within a sensorimotor framework of semantic memory, we found no areas
in which there was greater activity for low- versus high-resolution trials. We offer two
plausible explanations for why there is no variation in activity for the two types of trials.
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First, given a linguistic input (either written or heard words), these representations might
be of a serial nature, so that retrieval of the high-resolution representation is dependent on
(or occurs after) retrieval of the low-resolution representation. Alternatively, the
representations could be parallel in nature, so that both representations can be accessed
separately in theory, but a serial strategy is applied for this task. In other words, one
representation may be used to try to solve the current task, but if the initial attempt is
unsuccessful, the other type of representation is used instead. Investigation of these
accounts warrants further study, as the data from the experiments described in this study
cannot distinguish between the two possibilities.
There is also an alternative explanation of our data, based on the idea that both
trial types involved retrieval of a single representation, but that in the high-resolution
condition, this representation may be more difficult to retrieve. Consistent with this
explanation, RTs in both experiments were longer for high- versus low-resolution trials,
and there was differential activation in the fusiform gyrus. However, an explanation in
terms of varying levels of difficulty seems unlikely for the following reasons. First, RT
was a covariate in all fMRI data analysis, so that the differences in activation we reported
for each experiment cannot be attributed to RT differences — indeed, this type of
hierarchical regression model will tend to underestimate the effect of task on activation.
Second, in both experiments, the lingual gyrus was activated equally for both retrieval
conditions, so the specificity of our effects is not well explained by a task difficulty
explanation. Third, we found a positive correlation of Vis-Verb scores with brain activity
in the lingual gyrus for Experiment 1, as well as with improved task accuracy. Under a
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difficulty account, task accuracy should negatively correlate with lingual activity, but we
do not find this to be the case.

Conclusions
Taken together, this pair of studies demonstrates the first neuroimaging evidence
that context (a task factor) and cognitive style (an individual factor) can influence color
knowledge retrieval. Additionally, these studies suggest that these factors also influence
the degree to which color knowledge retrieval and color perception share a common
neural substrate. We have proposed that these factors affect the resolution of the color
information that is retrieved, and we suggest that the degree of overlap between color
retrieval and color perception depends on the match between the resolution of the
information required of each. More generally, these findings illustrate that color retrieval
is a more dynamic and variable process than previously described, and that some
modifications may be required to current sensorimotor theories of semantic memory.
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Table 3.1. Clusters identified in the secondary exploratory, whole-brain analysis. We
identified brain areas that were active at a p < 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold. Within the ~
100 most active voxels in each of these regions, we then tested significance of the WCCBCC contrast, as well as the correlation of brain activity with Vis-Verb scores. P-values
have been Bonferroni-corrected for significance (significant if p < 0.0038).
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Figure Captions
Figure 3.1. Design of Experiment 1.
Figure 3.2. Design of Experiment 2.
Figure 3.3. Task accuracy and left lingual gyrus activity correlate with cognitive style
preference. Pearson correlations (r) of self-reported cognitive style with task accuracy (a,
b) and signal change in left lingual region (c, d) for Experiment 1 (a, c) and Experiment 2
(b, d)
Figure 3.4. Areas of visual cortex show differences in activity when retrieving color
knowledge at differing levels of detail. fROI analysis of left lingual and left fusiform for
Experiment 1 (visual stimuli, a) and Experiment 2 (auditory stimuli, b). Error bars
indicate ±1 standard error.
Figure 3.5. Color perception and color knowledge retrieval activate overlapping brain
regions. Overlap of Experiment 1 fROIs for color perception (red) and color knowledge
(blue) in left fusiform (a) and left lingual (b) regions.
Figure 3.6. Color knowledge retrieval recruits overlapping brain regions in both
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. fROI overlap in left fusiform (a), left lingual (b). fROIs
are indicated for Experiment 1 (red), Experiment 2 (blue), and their overlap (green).
Slices are oriented according to radiological convention.
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Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.3.

	
  
	
  

80

Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.6.
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CHAPTER 4: Feature diagnosticity affects semantic representations of novel
objects
Abstract
A central principle in sensorimotor theories of concepts is that categories may
differentially rely on certain sensorimotor regions over others due to each category’s
properties. While there is evidence supporting some basic predictions based on
sensorimotor theories, less research exists about the principles leading to different
representations across categories. We explored how feature diagnosticity affected neural
conceptual representations, by examining how variation in diagnosticity of color
information affected recruitment of color-sensitive visual areas during conceptual
retrieval. For a given set of novel objects with assigned colors and names, subjects were
trained to learn that color and shape (“color+shape”) were necessary features in novel
object representations (similar to limes and lemons). Alternatively, they learned that
shape alone (“shape”) was a sufficient feature in novel object representations (similar to
stop signs and yield signs, where color is available but not necessary). Subjects
completed a feature-listing task describing the objects, and then performed a shape
knowledge retrieval task while undergoing fMRI. We found that when rating similarity
for two objects of the same color, “color+shape” subjects assigned higher ratings than
“shape” subjects. In the left fusiform gyrus, we found greater activity during the shape
retrieval task for “color+shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects. Additionally, despite
comparable explicit object color knowledge between the two groups, prioritizing color in
the feature-listing task correlated with brain activity in color-sensitive regions during the
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task. Finally, we also found a correlation of neural similarity with independent behavioral
ratings of color similarity, but solely for the “color+shape” group. These results suggest
that both knowledge of feature importance and use of that knowledge contribute to neural
representations. Further, when object representations are being activated, diagnostic
features may be retrieved automatically.
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Introduction
We are able to categorize rapidly an endless variety of objects in the world. How
is the semantic memory system organized in a way that allows us to perform this
cognitive operation, and what are the neural mechanisms that underlie it? The importance
of addressing this question is highlighted in patients who present with global
deterioration of conceptual knowledge accompanying semantic dementia (Bozeat,
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000; Snowden et al., 1999; Warrington,
1975), and particularly in patients with category-specific deficits, where categorical
knowledge is selectively lost (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice,
1984). Neuropsychological observation of these patients led Warrington and McCarthy
(1987) to propose that the semantic memory system is organized such that differentially
weighted values from multiple sensory modalities contribute to different object
categories, which could ultimately give rise to category-specific deficits. For example,
living things are represented by a greater proportion of visual features than non-living
things (Farah & McClelland, 1991).
This, and other early models of semantic memory, proposed varying importance
for the perceptual and functional features of objects that were distributed in modalityspecific brain regions. However, they did not specifically address whether certain
features played a greater role in the connection between feature acquisition and
subsequent semantic representations. Importantly, previous research has not just been
limited to sensory or functional features, having investigated the role of particular
features in earlier studies of categorization and category membership (Rosch & Mervis,
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1975; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). More recent connectionist models (Devlin et al.,
1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997) have offered a particular elaboration of prior models of
semantic memory organization, namely that certain features may be more informative for
identifying exemplars within a category. That is, when differentiating between a LION
and a TIGER, “has-fur” or “has-four-legs” will not help to distinguish between the two,
whereas “has-stripes” will.
Behavioral paradigms have demonstrated the effects of feature diagnosticity on
categorization and prototypicality. Critically, although participants can perceive
diagnostic features of an object as easily as non-diagnostic features, the features which
are most useful for discrimination may be selectively attended to and more heavily
weighted in that object’s representation (Schyns, 1998). Colors can be diagnostic for
object recognition, and when presented with objects having highly diagnostic colors,
subjects tend to name the objects faster and with fewer errors than for objects with nondiagnostic colors (Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). Children can be trained to attend to object
shape in the context of naming, which helps them to learn object names more quickly
(Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002). Finally, adults and
children can find statistical regularities (diagnostic components) that provide clues for
segmentation of complex human actions (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Baldwin, Andersson,
Saffran, & Meyer, 2008).
Other studies have also examined the role of feature diagnosticity in semantic
representations. Some computational models have revealed that diagnostic features,
which are defined as having more heavily weighted relevance in an object’s
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representation, are also most vulnerable to damage, both because they are more relevant
(i.e., more informative), and also because they are more weakly correlated with other
features of the object (Lombardi & Sartori, 2007; Randall, Moss, Rodd, Greer, & Tyler,
2004). Further, feature verification tasks of concept-feature or feature-concept have
shown that diagnostic features hold a privileged status in the overall representation of an
object, as responses were faster when the feature was diagnostic of the concept than when
the feature was shared amongst other category members (Cree, McNorgan, & McRae,
2006).
Neuroimaging and neurophysiological evidence has supported the idea of
differential patterns of activation when retrieving information about diagnostic object
features. One event-related potential (ERP) study has demonstrated that the weighting of
object properties depended on specific sensorimotor interactions (pantomiming an action
or pointing to a feature) during knowledge acquisition. Here, ERP results indicated that at
300 ms, the dorsal pathway was recruited to a greater extent in the pantomime relative to
the pointing group, suggesting retrieval of the action associated with each object (Kiefer,
Sim, Liebich, Hauk, & Tanaka, 2007). Additionally, single-unit and local field potential
studies have shown selective tuning of neurons in response to relevant features. In
macaque monkeys, neurons in the inferotemporal (IT) cortex showed an increased
response to diagnostic features, on the basis of the importance of those features for object
categorization (Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). A second study found that neurons in the
anterior IT cortex responded similarly to images showing either 10% or 50% relevant
information (Nielsen, Logothetis, & Rainer, 2006). This region-specific insensitivity to
	
  
	
  

88

the stimulus image itself (regardless of feature) was coupled with a graded response to
behaviorally relevant features in the posterior IT cortex. Thus, parts of a stimulus can be
preferentially represented if they are diagnostic for a behavior, and the neural
representation of an object can be influenced by both visual experience and viewing
history.
The behavioral and neural evidence presented thus far lends support to the idea
that diagnostic features have a dynamic interaction with object representations. Forming
these object representations requires experience, so how does the meaningfulness of that
experience, such as learning that a feature is diagnostic, influence object representations?
There has been relatively little research which systematically manipulates feature
diagnosticity to measure its neural effects on conceptual knowledge. This study focuses
on precisely that topic.
Previous work investigating feature diagnosticity has often done so by focusing
on natural or common object categories, relying on long-term experience with the objects
in order to detect differential weighting of features in object representations. These
studies often do not account for the variability introduced in object representations, which
might partly be caused by variations in overall experience with the tested object
categories. A complementary approach to these studies is to train subjects on novel object
sets, which by design bear no resemblance to common object sets. Training paradigms
carry the important benefit of controlling for stimulus features and subject experience,
and have been used previously to shed light on conceptual representations (Grossman,
Blake, & Kim, 2004; James & Gauthier, 2003; Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg, van
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Turennout, & Martin, 2007).
In the present study, we employ both univariate and multivariate techniques in
order to tackle the issue of how feature diagnosticity interacts with object
representations,. Recent neuroimaging studies utilizing multivariate methods have
demonstrated that patterns of brain activation, as opposed to averaged overall regional
activation, can carry meaningful information (e.g., Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al.,
2001; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). These newly developed techniques can detect or decode
fine-grained information that might not emerge from traditional univariate analyses.
Multivariate analyses have been used to decode categories of remembered stimuli (Polyn,
Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005), compare similarity of disparate categories (O’Toole et
al., 2005), and decode neural similarity within a single object category of abstract shape
(Op de Beeck, Torfs, & Wagemans, 2008), or a single natural category of mammals
(Weber et al., 2009). These multivariate analyses add a complementary approach to the
extant fMRI literature (Jimura & Poldrack, 2012).
For this experiment, we used a training paradigm to investigate the role of color
as a diagnostic feature in semantic representations. Subjects were trained on a set of
novel objects — they either learned that the conjunction of color and shape was
diagnostic of object category, or they learned that although color was available, shape
was sufficient to distinguish amongst the objects. Following training, subjects listed
object features and rated the objects for general similarity. A subset of these subjects
performed an object shape retrieval task while undergoing fMRI. We found group
differences in prioritizing color (at the individual item level) and rating general similarity
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(at the pairwise relational level), despite comparable levels of explicit color knowledge.
fMRI results indicated greater activation of ventral temporal cortex (specifically, left
fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus) during a shape retrieval task, and also
suggested that a multivariate measure of neural similarity predicted color similarity
ratings for the color-shape group only. Together, our results suggest that diagnostic
features may be accessed automatically when retrieving object representations. The
features that we use to categorize objects — and not simply the features that we explicitly
remember about them — contribute to neural representations of novel objects.
	
  

Methods
Participants:
Sixty-three (n = 63) healthy subjects participated in the study (17 males and 46
females; average age = 22.8 years, range = 18–30 years). Thirty-two (n = 32) of these
subjects participated in the subsequent fMRI portion of the study (9 males and 23
females; average age = 24.7 years, range = 18–30 years). All subjects were right-handed,
native speakers of English, and were not taking any psychoactive medications over the
course of the study. Those subjects who took part in the fMRI portion had no history of
neurological disorders and a healthy neurological profile. Subjects were paid at the rate of
$10/hour for behavioral portions of training, and $20/hour for participating in the fMRI
portion. Subjects provided written informed consent to participate and received monetary
compensation in return for their participation. The human subjects review board at the
University of Pennsylvania approved all experimental procedures.
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Training Materials and Procedure:
In a between-subjects design, subjects were randomly assigned to learn one of
two object sets. The between-subjects design was necessary because in a within-subjects
design, subjects may learn (across training sessions) that one feature is reliable for certain
objects but not others, which may create unintentional confusion.
In the “color+shape” set, color is necessary for object identification, and shape
information is not sufficient (e.g., objects have similar shapes but differ in color, like
lemons and limes). In the “shape” set, color is available for object identification, but
shape information is sufficient (e.g., objects differ in both shape and color, like stop signs
and yield signs). Subjects learned one of these objects sets over the course of four 30-60
minute training sessions that took place over seven days.

Stimuli: For either object set, as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, subjects were
trained on a set of 36 exemplars of 12 distinct object categories, each with a pseudoword
name (Rastle et al., 2002). Stimuli were created from scratch in Blender 2.48
(www.blender.org). All objects were given the same surface texture and illuminated with
the same single light source. For object shape, we created four shape variants for the
“color + shape” set, and twelve shape variants for the “shape” set (four of these shape
variants overlapped with those in the “color + shape” set: fulch, hinch, klarve, screll). For
object size, we created two additional size variants for each exemplar by halving or
doubling the scale of the object, thus creating three possible sizes for each object. Note
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that size was an irrelevant dimension for object identification. For object color, we used
Blender’s HSV color space, in which color is determined from a set of three values, one
each corresponding to hue, saturation and value (or luminance). We held saturation and
value constant, varying hue in order to create six distinct color categories for the objects.
With the variants that we created for the two object sets, the differences in the sets
can also be summarized as:
Color + shape:

Shape:

P(object | color) = 0.50

P(object | color) = 0.50

P(object | shape) = 0.33

P(object | shape) = 1.00

P(object | color ∩ shape) = 1.00

P(object | color ∩ shape) = 1.00

Two properties are critical between the two sets. First, note that in order to identify
successfully each object by distinguishing it from the others in the set (i.e., when
P(object) = 1.00), the “color + shape” set requires the conjunction of shape and color
information, whereas the “shape” set only requires shape information. Second, color
probability (i.e., that P(object | color) = 0.50) is matched between the two groups.
For each of the 36 exemplars, we then created 10-second videos of each exemplar
rotating on a raised, black platform against a gray background. In each video, the object
rotated a full 360 degrees on the platform. For all of the tasks described below, we used
PsyScope (http://psy.cns.sissa.it) to present stimuli and collect responses and response
times (RT). The training schedule and list of tasks can be found in Table 4.1. The
descriptions of training and testing tasks are below.
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Training, Video Exposure: Subjects viewed the video for each exemplar
sequentially, and each exemplar was shown twice. This sequential presentation resulted
in 72 videos that played for approximately 12 minutes. While each video played, the
name of that exemplar appeared below, and subjects were instructed to repeat aloud the
name of the object currently being viewed. Subjects watched the videos at the beginning
of the first, second, and third sessions.

Training, Naming: We assessed knowledge of the novel objects through a naming
task. Immediately after viewing the object videos, subjects were presented with a
screenshot of each of the 36 exemplars. Upon typing that exemplar’s name, they were
given corrective feedback for their responses. Subjects participated in the naming task
during each training session. We used four unique screenshots for each exemplar (at the
50th, 100th, 150th, and 200th frame of the video, counterbalanced across the size variants
for each object), such that subjects never viewed identical images for the same exemplar
(or for the same object) during this task. Three subjects who did not exceed 80%
accuracy on recalling object names by the end of training were excluded from further
analysis.

Testing, Adjective Generation Task: Feature listing has previously been used as a
measure of diagnosticity (e.g., Tanaka & Presnell, 1999), where features that are
considered to be diagnostic are listed earlier and more often than other features. In line
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with this rationale, for each trial of this task, we presented subjects with the names of one
of the learned objects. They were instructed to list a minimum of two (and a maximum of
four) adjectives that described the object. Subjects, who could proceed at their own pace,
pressed the ENTER key to proceed to the next trial. We administered this task during the
third session.

Testing, Pairwise Similarity Task: We assessed psychological similarity by
having subjects rate the general similarity of every pairing of the 12 learned novel
objects, resulting in 66 pairwise ratings. For each trial of this task, we presented subjects
with two object names, paired together, along with a scale numbered from 1 (very
dissimilar) to 9 (very similar). Subjects assigned each similarity rating at their own pace,
and each response triggered the beginning of the next pairing. We administered this task
during the fourth session. It is important to note that subjects were told to base their
judgments on general similarity, and they were not asked to base their ratings on any
particular object features.

Testing, Color Naming Task: At the end of the fourth session, the experimenter
verbally named each of the objects individually. Subjects were instructed to report the
color that they associated with that object, and the experimenter recorded the response.

Untrained Similarity Rating: In order to assess the relationship between
behavioral similarity and neural similarity (the procedure for which is described below),
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we obtained psychological similarity ratings based on perception (i.e., pictures) rather
than memory (i.e., names) of the novel objects. Thus, we slightly modified the pairwise
similarity task described earlier. On each trial of this task, subjects who were not
previously trained on the objects (n = 32 total subjects; n = 16 for each object set) saw a
pair of object images, side by side, along with a scale numbered from 1 (very dissimilar)
to 9 (very similar). Subjects did a randomized block of 66 trials in which they based their
ratings on either color or shape similarity, and then saw the images again and based their
ratings on the other type of similarity. We randomized trial order within both blocks, and
counterbalanced block order of color or shape. Post-experiment debriefing revealed that
the color did not interact with shape similarity, and vice versa.

fMRI Procedure:
Shape Retrieval Task: This task was only given to the 32 subjects who returned
for the fifth and final session of the study. On each trial of the task, while undergoing
fMRI, subjects read a question about one of the learned objects (e.g., “If you flipped a
YERTS over, would it stand up straight?”). There were 20 possible questions, and each
set of 20 questions was asked about each of the 12 objects, resulting in 240 questions. All
of the questions, which referred to object shape, can be found in Table 4.2.
The trial structure was as follows: At the beginning of each trial, a “READY?”
prompt appeared for 500 ms. A fixation cross then appeared for 500 ms, followed by the
question about the object. While the question remained on the screen for 4500 ms, the
subject was instructed to determine if the question referred to a plausible detail about the
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object’s shape, responding “yes” or “no” via button press. At the end of the trial, a central
fixation cross appeared for 500 ms, for a total trial duration of 6000 ms. Text was
presented as white font on a black background.
Each subject completed four scanning runs of the shape retrieval task
(approximately 9 minutes each) with 60 trials of the task per run. Using a rapid, eventrelated design, we presented a unique trial order to each subject, using Optseq2
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq) to generate optimized pseudo-random
stimulus presentation sequences. Experimental trials were intermixed with jittered
fixation periods averaging 6 seconds in length.

Functional Localizers: After subjects completed the shape retrieval task, we
administered two “functional localizers” in order to identify brain regions involved in
either color or shape perception. For the color perception localizer, subjects saw blocks of
the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue stimuli, in which they judged whether chromatic or
grayscale visual stimuli were made up of wedges sequentially ordered from lightest to
darkest. The methods and stimuli for this task were identical to those used previously to
identify brain regions involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al.,
2011; Simmons et al., 2007).
For the shape perception localizer, subjects performed a one-back task on blocks
of either intact shapes or scrambled images. On a 100 x 100 unit grid of black lines on a
white background, 108 intact and filled shapes were individually presented in the central
(20 x 20) portion of this grid. The 40 central units were scrambled to create the 108
	
  
	
  

97

scrambled images that preserved visual complexity but removed continuous borders.
Subjects saw randomly presented blocks of either 20 intact shapes or 20 scrambled
images. Within any given block, each image was presented for 400 msec, followed by a
blank screen that lasted for 500 msec, and two of the images would repeat. Subjects were
instructed to press a button each time they detected a repeated image. Each block lasted
for 18 sec, followed by 12 sec of fixation between blocks.
Subjects performed practice versions of all scanning tasks prior to the scan.

Image Acquisition
We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with an 8-channel
head coil and foam padding to secure the head in position. After we acquired T1weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size =
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.000 mm), each subject performed the color knowledge
retrieval task, followed by the color perception task, while undergoing blood oxygen
dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected 998 sets of 42 slices
using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000 msec, TE = 30 msec,
FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm). At least 9 seconds
of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each functional scan to allow
for steady-state magnetization; no stimuli were presented and no fMRI data were
collected during this initial time period.

Neuroimaging Data Analysis
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We analyzed the data off-line using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject were processed using the
FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence, motion corrected
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first
functional image as a reference, and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. The fMRI data were smoothed using a
9mm full-width half-max (FWHM) Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing
for each subject, a power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency
function, and this model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the
functional data (Zarahn et al., 1997).
We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each
subject’s data, in which task trials were each modeled as separate event with a 6 sec
duration, and convolved with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several
covariates of no interest, such as scan effects and movement spikes, were included in the
model. From this model, we computed parameter estimates for the task (compared to
fixation baseline) at each voxel. These parameter estimates were included in the grouplevel random effects analyses described below.

Results
Behavioral results:
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Training: Naming task. For naming task performance (see Figure 4.3), we
performed a repeated measures ANOVA (“color + shape” – n = 29; “shape” – n = 34)
with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction on naming response accuracy. This ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of training condition (F(1,61) = 11.42, p < 0.001, a
significant main effect of session F(1.28, 78.00) = 98.53, p < 0.001), and a significant
interaction of training condition and session (F(1.28, 78.00) = 7.21, p < 0.01). Critically,
by the fourth session which marked the end of the training period, the groups did not
differ in naming accuracy, as both groups were equally proficient at correctly producing
the names of the learned objects (mean accuracy for “color + shape”: 97.4%, mean
accuracy for “shape”: 98.3%; t(61) = 1.25, p > 0.2). These preliminary results suggest
that any differences on subsequent tasks cannot be attributed to differences in how well
both groups learned and knew the objects.
We performed a similar ANOVA on RT across the four sessions. This ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of training condition (F(1,61) = 22.53, p < 0.001), a
significant main effect of session (F(1.11, 67.80) = 72.49, p = 0.001), but no interaction
of training condition and session (F(1.11, 67.80) = 1.49, p > 0.2). By the fourth session,
the groups significantly differed in RT, with “color + shape” subjects taking longer to
produce the object names (mean RT for “color + shape”: 1417 ms, mean RT for “shape”:
1077 ms; t(61) = 5.39, p < 0.001).

Testing: Adjective Generation and Color Naming Tasks. For each subject, we
determined how often a color adjective correctly describing the object appeared as the
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first or second listed adjective. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant
interaction of adjective order and training condition (F(1,61) = 32.88, p < 0.001). An
independent samples t-test of color as the first adjective revealed that “color + shape”
subjects nearly always listed a color adjective first, and that “shape” subjects did not
(“color + shape”: M = 87.9%, SE = 4.0%, “shape”: M = 44.6%, SE = 6.5%; t(61) = 5.44,
p < 0.001). Despite this discrepancy in when the subjects listed color adjectives,
importantly, the groups did not differ in explicit color knowledge, as measured by their
ability to name the object colors afterwards (“color + shape”: M = 93.4%, SE = 2.3%,
“shape”: M = 90.5%, SE = 1.9%; t(61) = 0.98, p > 0.3, ns). These results, shown in
Figure 4.4, suggest that although the groups remembered object color equally, training
affected the extent to which they prioritized color in their representations of the objects.

Testing: Pairwise Similarity Task. For each subject, we examined pairings that
referred to same- or different-colored object pairs, and same- or different-shaped object
pairs. (It should be noted that in the “shape” set, there were no object pairs that were
same-shaped.) These results are shown in Figure 4.5. Both “color + shape” subjects and
“shape” subjects assigned same-colored object pairs a higher average similarity rating
than different-colored object pairs (“color + shape”: same color M = 4.94, SE = 0.28,
different color M = 2.69, SE = 0.08, t(28) = 8.38, p < 0.001; “shape”: same color M =
4.21, SE = 0.24, different color M = 2.74, SE = 0.19, t(33) = 7.04, p < 0.001). Critically,
“color + shape” subjects assigned same- versus different-colored object pairs a higher
range of general similarity ratings (as measured by same minus different) than did
	
  
	
  

101

“shape” subjects, and this group difference was statistically significant (t(61) = 2.27, p =
0.03). Same-shaped object pairs received the highest similarity ratings from the “color +
shape” subjects (same: M = 7.20, SE = 0.17, different: M = 1.94, SE = 0.10; t(28) =
24.02, p < 0.001).
Though both groups had the option to use the full 1 to 9 rating scale, the overall
range of ratings did differ between groups, with “color + shape” subjects using a wider
range of ratings than “shape” subjects (“color + shape” M = 8.31, SE = 0.13; “shape” M =
6.76, SE = 0.33; t(61) = 4.06, p < 0.001). Mean ratings did not differ between the groups
(“color + shape” M = 2.89, SE = 0.79; “shape” M = 2.87, SE = 0.19; t(61) = 0.11, p >
0.9).
These results suggest that the groups differ in the extent to which they weigh
color as part of the overall object representation, with “color + shape” subjects using a
wider range of similarity ratings to distinguish between object pairs. We now turn to
neuroimaging methods, in order to investigate whether some of these observed behavioral
differences are reflected in neural differences.

fMRI results:
ROI univariate analysis. In order to establish functionally defined regions of
interest (fROIs) in which we could assess any group differences in task effects, we first
performed a group-level random effects analysis on the color perception data, comparing
brain activity of colored stimuli to that of grayscale stimuli, as in prior studies. No
regions responded more to grayscale than colored stimuli. We performed an identical
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analysis on the shape perception data, separately from the color perception data, in which
we compared brain activity of intact shape stimuli to that of scrambled image stimuli,
also as in prior studies (e.g., Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000).
From the set of fROIs that emerged from this analysis, we identified the peak
cluster of voxels from lingual and fusiform gyri, as these regions have been documented
previously for their involvement in color perception and color knowledge retrieval
(Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2011; Martin, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007). To create
fROIs of comparable size across regions, we identified approximately 50 maximallyresponsive voxels in each of these regions, which required adjusting the threshold for
each individual fROI. Finally, within each of these fROIs, we calculated parameter
estimates for each subject on the spatially-averaged time series, in other words across the
50 voxels in the fROI, using these parameter estimates to assess task effects between the
two groups. We assessed task effects by using an independent samples t-test of the
difference in task effect between the “color + shape” and “shape” groups.
The left fusiform region (48 voxels, peak voxel t = 6.37, Talairach coordinates:
-30, -56, -17, BA 37) was sensitive to both color perception and a group difference in the
“shape” task (see Figure 4.6). Here, activation was significantly greater for the “color +
shape” subjects (mean % signal change = 0.41%, SE = 0.07%) than for the “shape”
subjects (mean % signal change = 0.22%, SE = 0.06%; t(30) = 2.02, p = 0.05). The
lingual region (52 voxels, peak voxel t = 9.56, Talairach coordinates: 3, -92, 20, BA
19/17) was sensitive to color perception, but did not show a significant group difference
in activity during the “shape” task (“color + shape”: mean % signal change = 0.32%, SE
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= 0.08%; “shape”: mean % signal change = 0.19%, SE = 0.08%; t(30) = 1.11, p > 0.2,
ns). Both the left lateral occipital complex (LOC) and right LOC were involved in shape
perception, but neither region showed a group difference in task activity (left LOC: t(30)
= 0.70, p > 0.4; right LOC: t(30) = 0.65, p > 0.5).
We thus focused the next set of analyses on activity in the left fusiform gyrus, as
this was the only region from the ROI analysis that was involved in color perception and
which also demonstrated a group difference in activity in the shape retrieval task.

Multivariate neural similarity analysis. We next adopted a measure of neural
similarity from Weber and colleagues (2009) in order to see if activation patterns in the
left fusiform fROI (48 voxels) predicted behavioral similarity ratings. For each of the 12
probed items, we identified a pattern of activation of vector length equal to the number of
voxels in the fROI. Although the order of the voxels in the vector was arbitrary, it was
consistent across all patterns. Some voxels within the fROI were, on average, more active
than others; thus, in order to prevent mean activation of voxels from driving our
similarity measure (a Pearson correlation), we mean-centered each voxel’s response to its
average response across all items. We calculated neural similarity by correlating each of
the 66 vector pairs, then assessed whether these values could predict behavioral ratings of
similarity. We could not assume a linear relationship for the behavioral ratings of
similarity; in other words, the difference between ratings of 4 and 5 is not necessarily the
same as the difference between ratings of 8 and 9. Consequently, we used the Spearman
rank correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between neural and behavioral
	
  
	
  

104

similarity.
As shown in Figure 4.8, in the left fusiform gyrus, color similarity ratings
approached significance in predicting neural similarity for the “color + shape” subjects
(rs = 0.22, p = 0.08), but not for the “shape” subjects (rs = -0.13, p > 0.2). These
predictions were significantly different from each other (Z = 1.98, p < 0.05). Shape
similarity ratings did not predict neural similarity in this region. for either the “color +
shape” subjects (rs = 0.18, p = 0.17) or the “shape” subjects (rs = 0.01, p > 0.9).
Interestingly, this pattern switched direction in the lingual gyrus. In that region, color
similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for the “shape” subjects (rs = 0.25, p =
0.04) than for “color + shape” subjects (rs = -0.14, p > 0.2), and these predictions
significantly differed (Z = -2.22, p = 0.03).

Exploratory analyses. In order to assess the specificity of our effect, we examined
other regions of the left ventral temporal cortex other than those used for our primary a
priori analyses. For this analysis, we looked at an anatomically-defined left ventral
temporal cortex region (~ 5500 voxels). In this region, we looked for voxel clusters (> 50
voxels) that showed a significant task (task versus baseline) X group (color+shape versus
shape) interaction at a cluster-corrected, permuted threshold of α < 0.05. Only one region,
namely the left inferior temporal gyrus (Talairach coordinates of peak voxel: -56, -53, 12, BA 20), surpassed this threshold.
In this region (see Figure 4.7), we found significantly greater activity during the
shape retrieval task for color/shape-trained subjects than for shape-trained subjects (p <
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0.001). As shown in Figure 4.9, we also found that the extent to which subjects
prioritized color during the adjective generation task (i.e., how often they listed the object
color as the first adjective) predicted activity in this region (r = 0.50, p < 0.01). Similar
patterns were observed in the left fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus, the two regions
identified from the color perception functional localizer. It should be noted that the
adjective generation task was performed on the third day of training, whereas subjects
performed the shape retrieval task during the fifth session. This result suggests that when
retrieving object knowledge, diagnostic features may be automatically activated. The
range of general similarity scores for same- versus different-colored object pairs also
correlated with activity in this region, such that a wider range of scores positively
correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal gyrus (r = 0.39, p = 0.02).

Discussion
In the current study, we report several behavioral and neural results indicating that
feature diagnosticity affects semantic representations. In addition to behavioral group
differences at both the individual exemplar and pairwise comparison level, we report a
neural instantiation of feature diagnosticity. In ventral temporal cortex, and specifically in
the left fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus, we found greater activity for
subjects who had learned color was a useful diagnostic feature when performing a task
that did not require color retrieval. Finally, we found that in the left fusiform gyrus,
behavioral ratings of color similarity predicted neural similarity for the “color + shape”
group only, and that prioritizing color correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal
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gyrus. Together, these results suggest that our knowledge of feature importance for object
categorization, in addition to using that knowledge, affects neural representations of those
objects. To our knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate an important role for
feature diagnosticity, when the diagnostic feature (here, color) is systematically
manipulated.
The adjective generation task and color naming task showed that while both
groups were equally proficient in explicit color knowledge, the “color + shape” subjects
prioritized color more by listing it first more frequently. This result is particularly
interesting in light of some work from Connolly and colleagues (Connolly, Gleitman, &
Thompson-Schill, 2007), which used an implicit similarity measure to assess how both
sighted and congenitally blind subjects represented fruits and vegetables — a category in
which color is arguably a diagnostic feature. Although both sighted and congenitally
blind subjects were equally proficient at knowing the colors of the fruits and vegetables,
only the sighted subjects used color as the primary basis for their implicit similarity
judgment. The authors suggested that visual experience (or lack thereof) had contributed
to a fundamental group difference in how conceptual representations for these categories
were structured.
Our results replicate and extend those of Connolly and colleagues. We matched
our training stimuli in terms of color availability and probability (for both sets, it was
always the case that P(object | color) = 0.5), yet we found fundamental differences in
how subjects weighed color in their conceptual representations of the objects. We can
stipulate color knowledge of a klarve for both groups of subjects from the color naming
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task, but the adjective generation task yields information about the usefulness of color in
distinguishing a klarve from the other objects in the set.
The results from these two tasks are also compelling for another reason. The
shapes used in the training stimuli were deliberately created such that they bore no
resemblance to common objects and thus would not be easily named. In the adjective
generation task, subjects tried (and occasionally struggled) to generate adjectives for the
objects, sometimes resorting to shape adjectives that were easily verbalized (e.g., a klarve
is “curved”), or likening the shapes to ones that they knew (e.g., a klarve is “footballlike”). Given this observed difficulty in describing the objects, one might expect the
subjects to then rely on color: a salient feature of the object that is easily named.
However, as described above, we observed that “shape” subjects did not use color for this
purpose — and for some of these subjects, color was never mentioned at all. This result
strengthens our argument that the object set differences, together with subsequent
differences in visual experience, contributed to fundamental differences in how the
groups represented the novel objects.
While the adjective generation task is a useful method of investigating object
representations at the item level, the pairwise similarity data provided a complementary
method for investigating the representations at the relational level. Knowledge of an
object category can extend beyond its respective label to include similarity, and several
theories have proposed that similarity amongst instances of a category is critical for
category membership (Murphy, 2004). The data here demonstrate a fundamental
difference in how the “color + shape” subjects considered the general similarity of same	
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versus different-color object pairs. Given the unavoidable heterogeneity in constructing
the two object sets, restricting the analysis to those stimuli that were shared between the
two groups (klarve, hinch, fulch, screll) replicated our initial similarity findings. The
“color + shape” subjects both rated same-color object pairs as being more generally
similar than did the “shape” subjects, but they also rated different-color object pairs as
being more generally dissimilar than did the “shape” subjects. In addition to replicating
our earlier similarity data, this analysis demonstrates that diagnostic features can be
regarded in the long-term experience context of other objects in the set. Not only does
feature knowledge affect a conceptual representation, but our data show that the use of
that knowledge, and the learned context of the objects, can also affect conceptual
representations.
Turning to the neuroimaging data, we hypothesized a group difference in
accessing color as a diagnostic feature during a shape retrieval task in the left fusiform
gyrus. Our findings were in line with our initial hypothesis, in that the left fusiform gyrus,
which is known to be a region involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu
et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2007), was indeed more active during the shape retrieval task
for “color + shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects. These results are all the more
compelling, given than the shape retrieval task never explicitly probed subjects about
object color, and color was irrelevant to the task. Our findings suggest that diagnostic
features may be accessed automatically, when retrieving other non-diagnostic features of
an object representation.
Further, our follow-up exploratory analyses revealed a pattern in the left inferior
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temporal gyrus that was somewhat unexpected. This region was lateral and anterior to the
medial fusiform region that has been identified through the color perception functional
localizer here and in previous work. Chao and Martin (1999) previously showed that the
left inferior temporal gyrus was involved in color knowledge retrieval. In that study, the
experimenters identified the region as having a greater response to naming colors
associated with achromatically presented object drawings, versus naming the objects
themselves. Further, the extent to which subjects prioritized color during the adjectivegeneration task correlated with activity in this region (and this pattern was similar in
other color perception regions), suggesting a neural basis for the importance that subjects
assigned to color during object learning.
Our results in both the left fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus could
be interpreted as falling within anterior portions of the ventral visual pathway, but it has
been suggested that object representations may be abstracted as they move from primary
visual cortex to downstream visual areas. More specifically, whereas posterior visual
areas such as the lingual gyrus might be sensitive to the sensory qualities of stimuli,
regardless of task, the anterior visual areas such as the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri
might be more involved in higher order categorization.
Interestingly, our analysis of neural similarity revealed an unexpected pattern. In
the left fusiform gyrus (which had demonstrated group differences in task activity), color
similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for “color + shape” subjects. By
contrast, in the lingual gyrus, color similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for
“shape” subjects. The difference in the group patterns in these two regions suggests
	
  
	
  

110

functional differences between lingual gyrus and fusiform gyrus as reflected in the two
object sets. More specifically, the extent of color information for the “shape” subjects
might be limited to sensory color qualities of the objects, reflected in the correlation of
behavioral and neural similarity in the lingual gyrus. If color information for the “color +
shape” subjects is carried to higher order areas, because of the diagnosticity of color
information for these objects, that might be reflected in the correlation of behavioral and
neural similarity for these subjects in the fusiform gyrus.
The nature of our novel object sets, in a sense, forced subjects to categorize
objects according to strict color-shape conjunctions. Thus, our experimental design may
have been more amenable towards group differences in an anterior color region, but it
does not preclude similar group differences in a posterior color region. In fact, group
differences in the shape task showed the same directional effect in lingual gyrus as in
fusiform gyrus, though not significantly so. Since the magnitude of the group difference
increased from the posterior to anterior regions of ventral temporal cortex, this result
might suggest an increased sensitivity to diagnostic features in regions which are tuned to
object categorization. In line with this theory, Nielsen and colleagues (2006) found that
the macaque IT cortex differentially responded to diagnostic features along a posterioranterior axis, and that only the anterior portion of the recording area responded with
diagnostic local field potential (LFP) activity.
Studies that utilize a training paradigm are methodologically attractive, as they
control for variables such as viewing experience and viewing history, which, under
experience-based models of semantic memory, can introduced unwanted variability to
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object representations. An important remaining question is the extent to which the results
from the training paradigm described in this study would generalize to common object
categories. For example, fruits and vegetables are a common object category for which
color is arguably a diagnostic feature, unlike tools or household items. Thus, during a
shape retrieval task, we might expect greater activity in color-sensitive regions for fruits
and vegetables than for household items. Our finding of automatic color knowledge
retrieval in the left inferior temporal gyrus, replicating a main finding from Chao and
Martin (1999) when retrieving color knowledge about common objects, suggests that we
might expect to observe such generalization.
Collectively, the results of the current study provide unique evidence that
diagnostic features affect novel object representations through not only what we know
about the novel objects, but also how we use that knowledge. Our findings suggest that
neural representations may not be stable and fixed, but may instead be far more dynamic
and flexible than previously thought (Binder & Desai, 2011; Hoenig, Sim, Bochev,
Herrnberger, & Kiefer, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, in press). More broadly, our results
suggest that feature diagnosticity is one of many sources contributing to variation in
semantic representations, the neural correlates of which may underlie our ability to
categorize rapidly the massive variety of objects that we encounter on a daily basis.
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Table 4.1. Subject training schedule, in which the specific combination of tasks is
indicated for each session of the experiment.

Training
Training Videos
Naming Task

Session
1

2

3

4

u
u

u
u

u
u

u

Testing
Adjective Generation
Pairwise Similarity
fMRI + memory task
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u
u
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Table 4.2. The list of questions used in the shape retrieval task that subjects performed
while undergoing fMRI. Note that “chulge” here is an example — we asked the same list
of 20 questions of all 12 novel object categories.
List of Questions:
Could you cut something with a CHULGE?
Could you poke a hole with a CHULGE?
Could you roll a CHULGE down a hill?
Could you use a CHULGE as a weapon?
Does a CHULGE have corners?
If you flipped a CHULGE over, would it stand up straight?
Is a CHULGE bulging?
Is a CHULGE bumpy?
Is a CHULGE cubic?
Is a CHULGE flimsy?
Is a CHULGE fragile?
Is a CHULGE made up of smaller parts?
Is a CHULGE rounded?
Is a CHULGE sharp?
Is a CHULGE symmetrical?
Is a CHULGE tied together?
Would a CHULGE be easy to wrap up (e.g., as a present)?
Would you be able to spin a CHULGE?
Would you call a CHULGE curved?
Would you consider a CHULGE to be flat?
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Figure Captions

Figure 4.1. Exemplars from the “color + shape” object set.

Figure 4.2. Exemplars from the “shape” object set.

Figure 4.3. Naming accuracy by session. The groups did not differ in naming accuracy
by the end of training, as indicated by ceiling accuracy from both groups during the
fourth session.

Figure 4.4. Differences in knowing versus naming colors. (left) The groups differed in the
extent to which they prioritized color, as measured by the frequency of listing color early
in an adjective generation task. “Color + shape” subjects listed color as the first adjective
earlier and more often than did “shape” subjects. (right) The groups did not differ in
explicit color knowledge.

Figure 4.5. Similarity judgments vary by group. “Color + shape” subjects (left) utilized a
greater range of general similarity judgments than “shape” subjects did (right),
particularly when judging same- versus different-colored object pairs.

Figure 4.6. Group differences in activation of a color perception region during a shape
retrieval task. During a shape retrieval task, the left fusiform gyrus, a region involved in
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color perception as defined by greater response to chromatic than achromatic visual
stimuli, was more active for “color + shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects.

Figure 4.7. Task activity in the left inferior temporal gyrus. Exploratory analyses
revealed that the left inferior temporal gyrus demonstrated a significant task x group
interaction, with “color+shape” subjects demonstrating more task activity than “shape”
subjects.

Figure 4.8. Correlating behavioral and neural similarity. Behavioral ratings of color
similarity from a set of untrained subjects approach significance in predicting neural
similarity of novel object activation patterns in the left fusiform gyrus, but only for the
“color + shape” subjects, shown in blue. “Shape” subjects are shown in red. A different
pattern is seen in the lingual gyrus, with no significant pattern seen in the left inferior
temporal gyrus.

Figure 4.9. Correlating color prioritization with task activity. Prioritizing color during
the adjective generation task only correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal
gyrus, a second region active during the shape retrieval task that was identified through
secondary exploratory analyses. Patterns in the same direction were observed in the left
fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus.
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Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.9.
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CHAPTER 5: General Discussion and Future Directions

We began by noting that you probably know what color fire engines are supposed
to be, and the kinds of sounds that cows make. We also noted that this type of knowledge
is known as semantic memory, and that the neural mechanisms underlying semantic
memory are complex. Numerous behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological
studies have investigated these topics, many of which have found evidence supporting the
notion of a distributed semantic memory system that is organized by sensory modality
(e.g., Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Models of a distributed
semantic memory system predict that overlapping or adjacent brain regions are likely to
be involved in both perception and memory retrieval of conceptual representations. The
major goal of the three investigations described above was to investigate the
commonalities and variations in the mapping between perception and memory, in order
to gain a deeper understanding of how conceptual representations are instantiated in the
brain.
In Chapter 2, we applied the logic behind many neuroimaging studies of semantic
memory, and were able to show that the left lingual gyrus was involved in chromaticity
of both color perception and color knowledge. In Chapter 3, we demonstrated that the
mapping between perception and memory varies across different contexts, in the form of
high- versus low-fidelity of retrieved color information. Color knowledge retrieval can
also vary across participants, as individual differences predicted activity in the left lingual
gyrus. In Chapter 4, we used a complementary approach to studies of semantic memory,
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by utilizing a training paradigm based on novel objects in order to investigate the role of
feature diagnosticity. This study showed that feature importance and feature use can both
affect conceptual representations. Specifically, we found that in object representations,
there were differences in “knowing about” versus “using” diagnostic features. We also
found that activity in ventral temporal regions — specifically, the left fusiform gyrus and
the left inferior temporal gyrus — varied according to that feature’s importance.
Combining the results from these three different studies allows us to speculate on
how this work might be relevant to theories of semantic memory.

Insight into color representations in the ventral visual pathway
Neuroimaging results of color perception found that ventral fROIs uniformly
showed chromaticity effects, whereas dorsal fROIs did not. In Chapter 2, we found
chromaticity effects in both color perception and color knowledge in the left lingual
gyrus, a very posterior visual region. The left fusiform gyrus, further anterior (and
downstream) from the lingual gyrus, demonstrated a robust task effect, but a weak – at
best – chromaticity effect. The different responses in these distinct visual regions suggest
functional differences between early and downstream regions of the visual pathway,
which may have different properties for color representations.
First, the mapping between perception and memory may vary as a function of
progression along the visual pathway. Simmons and colleagues (2007) have examined the
role of lingual and fusiform gyri in perception and memory, suggesting posterior regions
underlie low-level sensory color experience, whereas anterior regions underlie higher	
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level color representations. Because we used a luminance (i.e., brightness) judgment for
assessing both color perception and color knowledge, we may have tapped into lowerlevel sensory qualities of the stimuli, thereby enhancing the chromaticity effect in
posterior lingual regions, and not in anterior fusiform regions.
If anterior regions are indeed more sensitive to higher-level representations of
color, then we would expect to see greater chromaticity effects in an anterior fusiform
region if the task tapped into categorical color representations. One way to test this
prediction would be to use the same chromatic stimuli as described in Chapter 2, but
instead of a luminance judgment, subjects would be asked to make a color judgment in
terms of “warm” (red, orange, and yellow) versus “cool” (blue, green and purple).
Adopting this taxonomy would not call direct attention to color categorization per se, but
might instead drive activation forward into an anterior region which is expected to have
greater sensitivity to higher-level color representations.
Alternatively, it may be the case that chromatic color space varies from
achromatic color space. As discussed in Chapter 2, we did observe a higher magnitude of
response to chromatic versus achromatic stimuli, but that observation in itself does not
distinguish between potential differences in the activation patterns elicited by different
color categories within those respective color spaces. In other words, remembering purple
items and green items may elicit overall activation that is greater than remembering gray
items and white items. But, activation patterns of purple and green items may be more
different than activation patterns of gray and white items. Studies that examine multivoxel patterns in the brain (e.g., Haushofer, Livingstone, & Kanwisher, 2008; O’Toole,
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Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005; Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons,
2009) are well-suited for investigating this type of discrimination, and might be a useful
way to purple this question in future research. Specifically, we would expect to see
superior classification performance in early visual areas (e.g., lingual gyrus) when
distinguishing chromatic from achromatic items, whereas classification performance in
downstream visual areas (e.g., fusiform gyrus) might be activated in differentiating
purple from green items.

Variation in semantic memory retrieval across individuals
A high proportion of work in neuroimaging has implicitly assumed that brains are
approximately homogeneous, at least in terms of their low-level functions. In recent
years, some cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have begun advocating a more
nuanced strategy, which would incorporate both group-based (experimental) and
individual-based (correlational) ways of studying brain and behavior. In this perspective,
experimental approaches would identify commonalities in a population, whereas
correlational approaches can focus more closely on variation amongst individuals. Such
an approach would be consistent with the comments of Thompson-Schill and colleagues,
“the mark of a theory’s explanatory power is the degree to which it makes successful
predictions not only about the central tendency of a population, but also about the
individuals within that population” (Thompson-Schill, Braver, & Jonides, 2005). Though
there was initially some general reluctance to combine these two approaches, particularly
in neuroimaging studies (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 2002), the correlational approach has
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become more prevalent in psychological domains such as personality, decision-making,
and cognitive control abilities.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that we can uncover meaningful results by making use of
both experimental and correlational approaches. In particular, we did not find a main
effect from our task in early visual cortex (e.g., left lingual gyrus), but we did find
considerable variation in activity across individuals. Specifically, we found that subjects
who self-reported having preference for a visual cognitive style, as opposed to a verbal
cognitive style, tended to achieve better task accuracy and also showed greater activity in
early visual cortex. This result suggests that visualizers are inclined to remember color
information in higher fidelity, maintaining a representation of that information that is
closer to how that information was initially perceived. This finding also suggests a neural
instantiation in the brain for Allan Paivio’s dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1969), which
proposed distinct representations for information processed separately in visual and
verbal channels.
Individual variation in knowledge representations is a compelling idea, especially
given that semantic memory is typically thought of as being general knowledge which is
shared across a population. What are the properties of our conceptual representations that
can demonstrate this individual variation? As discussed in Chapter 3, activity in the
posterior visual cortex did appear to correlate with cognitive style, whereas activity in the
anterior visual cortex did not. This difference between the anterior and posterior cortices
suggests that individual variation in shared knowledge representations can vary in both
style and magnitude along the visual pathway. Specifically, it may be true that the degree
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of interaction between individual variation in conceptual knowledge representations is
more prominent in early visual cortex than in downstream visual cortex. But, if
abstraction of information occurs through the visual pathway – analogous to hierarchical
visual processing for object recognition (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004) – individual
variation might also decrease as information moves along a posterior-anterior axis. If this
hypothesis is correct, then information would become more “individual-invariant.” One
potential avenue for future research would be to sample the visual pathways along this
axis, in order to assess how abstraction of information interacts with individual
differences in conceptual representations, and perhaps also is affected by preference with
respect to the format of conceptual representations.

Variations in semantic memory across different contexts
The results reported in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that there can be variation in
knowledge retrieval based on both short-term contextual factors (e.g., task demands) and
long-term contextual environment (e.g., other present object categories). Chapter 3
demonstrated the existence of short-term context effects in the fidelity of color
representations during a similarity task. Chapter 4 focused instead on long-term context
effects, and showed that subjects judged differently the four object categories that were
shared across the different groups of novel objects, depending on whether color was a
relevant distinction in differentiating between objects. Together, these results show that
context plays an important role in semantic representations.
The results of Chapters 3 and 4 show that context can affect representations at
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multiple timescales. This is consistent with other research demonstrating a timescale for
activation of object features (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). Using an eyetracking paradigm, Yee and colleagues demonstrated that object representations unfold
over time, and that specific features such as shape were accessed earlier than general
features such as function. In line with those findings, the experiments in Chapter 3
suggest a neural basis for requiring a particular specificity in retrieved color information
(through context-related task demands).
Future research on how contextual factors can affect semantic representations
might use a joint eye-tracking and fMRI approach in order to tackle some of the
dynamics of these context effects. Specifically, we would predict that even if subjects
look towards objects that share a similar association (e.g., function), we might still
observe increased brain activity in independent regions subserving perception of the
specific, unique feature of those objects (e.g, shape). Using shape as the example here,
we might predict activity in regions such as bilateral lateral occipital complex (LOC) or
lingual gyrus.
Over the long term, contextual association depends on experience. For instance,
someone who is habitually exposed only to red apples and yellow lemons will probably
build up a strong association between “red” and “apples,” whereas someone who is
habitually exposed to red apples, red cherries, and yellow lemons is likely to have a far
weaker association between “red” and “apples.” Such effects might be at least partially
independent of short-term contextual factors, because at least in theory, there is no
amount of task demand could vary the association of red with “apple-cherry” to match
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that of “apple-lemon” (or vice versa). Alternatively, if task demand were able to match
the two associations, then this would demonstrate the existence of an interaction between
short- and long-term contextual factors. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is difficult to devise
experiments covering such interactions with the use of real-world objects. By contrast,
training paradigms based on novel objects can be a useful tool for experiments in this
area, as they permit experimental manipulation and control of viewing experience,
viewing history, and task demands.
Another possible avenue for future research in this area would focus on the
interaction between episodic and semantic memory, and more specifically, whether the
variation in learning rate of the novel objects reflected meaningful individual differences
that we did not test in the current set of studies. The critical test for the experiments
described in Chapter 4 was that both groups had achieved ceiling naming accuracy by the
end of training, which was our measure of object knowledge. However, there was
substantial variation in the rate at which subjects learned the names and attributes of the
novel objects, with some subjects achieving ceiling accuracy after just one session. In
addition, subjects anecdotally revealed different strategies for remembering the objects.
As an example, one subject verbalized his strategy for remembering the whemp (a
bronze-orange colored object) as sounding like “wimp.” To him, because wimps finish, at
best, in third place, he associated whemp with bronze. For other subjects, it was a matter
of “catching on” to the rules before they were able to reach ceiling accuracy on object
knowledge.
An experimental strategy which incorporated individual differences could
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uncover the reasons for some of this temporal variation, and thus shed light on the
differences in learning rate among individuals. Through this approach, one could also
investigate differences in the individual strategies used to categorize objects. As one
example, subjects utilizing a verbal association strategy might be able to categorize
rapidly objects faster than subjects who utilize alternative strategies. Although a verbal
strategy presents an advantage for this specific paradigm, in different contextual
environments it might be inferior to other strategies. For example, an environment
requiring feature matching would presumably favor visual rather than verbal strategies,
so that individuals preferring the visual style would be able to learn more quickly than
their counterparts who favor the verbal style. Much more generally, this approach to
research into the interactions between semantic and episodic memory might provide
greater insight into the meaningful variation across individuals.

A dynamic color network?
The results from these three studies suggest that semantic knowledge is
represented by a highly interactive and dynamic network. Posterior visual regions appear
to be sensitive to the sensory qualities (such as luminance) of visual information, and are
also sensitive to individual preferences or strategies (such as visualizing versus
verbalizing) for information representation. By contrast, anterior visual regions do not
appear to be sensitive to the sensory qualities of visual information, but are important in
retrieving varying degrees of knowledge “resolution” and also in retrieving diagnostic
and useful features automatically. These studies show that item-level variation (from
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objects and individuals) affects early visual areas, whereas more relational and higherorder context-level variation (from task demands or learned environment) affects
downstream visual areas.
These results are consistent with a general view that visual information travels
along a hierarchy of processing, along a posterior-anterior gradient (e.g., Grill-Spector &
Malach, 2004). Visual representations can be represented at multiple levels of abstraction
along this gradient, and are affected by a number of single and relational factors along the
visual pathway. The neuroimaging-based results shown here could corroborate vision
research, and provide evidence that semantic representations can be similarly dynamic
and complex.

Conclusions
The research described in this dissertation focused on semantic memory, which is
the basis for shared general knowledge. The results of these three studies help to delimit
the variation and the commonalities in this shared general knowledge, allowing us to
better understand the neural mechanisms underlying how we give meaning to endless
variation in the world. The studies described here have demonstrated that in distinct
regions subserving perception and memory, there is meaningful variation in context,
individual differences, and information utility. These studies paint a richer and more
complex picture of how we represent object categories, and how those representations are
instantiated in the brain. In particular, the results presented here suggest that there is a
network of visual regions, and that some of these regions are sensitive to contextual
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factors, while others represent item-level or relational differences. Therefore, these
studies can provide a framework for a deeper understanding of the interactions between
brain and behavior.
More generally, research in the domain of episodic memory has repeatedly
demonstrated that memory is not infallible. Semantic memory is defined as being distinct
from episodic memory, because it assumes generalities in shared knowledge. The
majority of prior research has assumed that semantic memory is more stable than
episodic memory, but the results shown above suggest that it may no longer be
reasonable to maintain this assumption. The results of these studies may form the basis
for showing how variations and commonalities can both be influential in neural
representations of objects, and thus help us better understand how both factors can affect
the ways in which we identify and give meaning to the objects and phenomena that we
encounter in the world.
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